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Prime numbers are what is left when you have taken all the patterns away. I 
think prime numbers are like life. They are very logical but you could never 
work out the rules, even if you spent all your time thinking about them.
χ 
~ Mark Haddon 
 
[J]ustification  of  a  given  end  depends  not  on  our  ability  to  identify 
indubitable  first  principles  that  support  it  but  rather  on  our  ability  to 
persuade others to act upon one set of uncertain beliefs rather than another.
ε  
~ Eric MacGilvray 
 
[T]o be a full human agent, to be a person or a self in the ordinary meaning, 
is to exist in a space defined by distinctions of worth. A self is a being for 
whom certain questions of categoric value have arisen, and received at least 
partial answers. Perhaps these have been given authoritatively by the culture 
more  than  they  have  been  elaborated  in  the  deliberation  of  the  person 
concerned, but they are his in the sense that they are incorporated into his 
self-understanding, in some degree and fashion. My claim is that this is not 
just a contingent fact about human agents, but is essential to what we would 
understand and recognize as full, normal human agency.
φ 
~ Charles Taylor 
 
Government  must  treat  all  subject  to  its  dominion  with  equal  concern: 
everyone's lives matter, and equally. That is non-negotiable.
γ 
~ Ronald Dworkin 
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§ 1.0 REASONING ABOUT JUSTICE: FINISHING THE "BECAUSE CLAUSE" 
 
We live in an age that swings wildly from passionate commitment to studied 
skepticism. True believers who are certain about right and wrong co-exist 
with cynics who are equally sure that all claims about morality and justice are 
“just your opinion.” Fierce defenders of the rule of law and human rights 
contend  with  hard-nosed  realists  who  view  legal  reasoning  and  rights 
discourse as ideologies whose only purpose is to dress up power relationships 
to make them seem legitimate, inducing the oppressed to accept their fate 
and suffer in silence. Rationalists who view justice as based on human reason 
vie  with  irrationalists  who  view  justice  as  a  human  invention  based  on 
essentially nonrational grounds. Deontological theorists who believe moral 
duties can be derived from a deep understanding of the human condition 
contend  with  utilitarians  who  think  the  only  legitimate  way  to  respect 
individuals is to maximize satisfaction of human preferences, whatever they 
happen to be.  
The irony is that both believers and cynics see little need to justify their 
beliefs to others or to engage in acts of persuasion. You either see the light or 
you don’t; morality and justice are either based on reason or on unfettered 
individual preference.
1 Whether the truth is a set of universal norms or the 
absence of any pre-given norms at all, there appears to be no means to bridge 
gaps of understanding or commitment.
2 The truth for both sides is a matter 
of faith. 
Then there are the rest of us – the muddled middle. We have intuitions 
about  what  is  just,  moral,  good,  and  right,  and  we  sometimes  feel  quite 
strongly  about  those  intuitions.  Indeed,  those  intuitions  seem  like  much 
more than personal preferences; certain things seem fundamentally right not 
“just for us” but for everyone.
3 We can even give reasons for our views and 
                                                 
1 ROBERT FOGELIN, WALKING THE TIGHTROPE OF REASON: THE PRECARIOUS LIFE OF A RATIONAL 
ANIMAL 3 (2003) (arguing that we often appear to be forced to choose between absolutism and 
nihilism as in the idea that "[e]ither absolute moral standards exist or there is no such thing as 
morality."). 
2 See id. at 11 ("those who defend so-called absolutes and those who adopt various forms of 
absolute  relativism  share  a  commitment  to  a  rationalist  ideal.  Those  who  think  that  the 
rationalist ideal can be satisfied swing one way; those who think it cannot, swing the opposite 
way. Under the sway of the rationalist ideal, no middle ground seems possible, and none is 
tolerated."). 
3 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 92 (1993) ("Mere likings or tastes 
are  distinguished  from  other  attitudes  in  that  they  are  largely  exempt  from  processes  of 
justification."). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  3 
answer objections from those who promote competing claims.
4 Yet, if we are 
thoughtful, we are aware of objections that can be made to our own claims. 
Moreover, not only are such things essentially contested, but on reflection, 
we find that our own arguments are often inconsistent. We want freedom of 
action, but we also want security, and there is no way to achieve security for 
ourselves and our families without limiting freedom of action. Where do we 
draw the line? We want freedom of religion but we do not necessarily think 
this means a church should be able to ring its bells all night if this will keep 
everyone  else  from  getting  some  sleep.  We  want  to  be  able  to  use  our 
property as we see fit but we recognize that we cannot, in general, use our 
property in ways that harm others, and the question of how to define what 
constitutes a “harm” is a perennial cause of disagreement. 
In short, there are hard cases where our values conflict, and lawyers know 
that  nonlawyers  severely  underestimate  the  number  of  hard  cases  we  are 
likely to face. We have trouble drawing lines in hard cases, and we have even 
more  trouble  defending  our  moral  beliefs  to  those  who  have  opposite 
intuitions  or  commitments.  Disagreement  seems  to  be  permanent  and 
inevitable  –  even  among  persons  of  good  will  who  actively  seek  to  reach 
agreement or to discover the truth of the matter. When asked to defend our 
views, we can come up with reasons, but we know that our arguments can 
always be met with the question “Why?” and we are acutely aware that at 
some point, we have nothing else to say. What is the foundation of assertions 
of justice, morality, right, and fairness? Why is a claim of justice any more 
than your personal opinion? Is it possible to reason about justice? 
Philosophers want to know the answer to these questions; they want to 
think clearly and get to the bottom of things. Legal theorists are also eager to 
find out if judicial pronouncements about the law are anything other than 
assertions of raw power or  partisan advantage.  These theorists are not so 
different from children who annoy their parents by repeatedly asking “why?” 
again and again until we no longer know what to say. “Why not do that?” we 
ask, and the reply is: “Because it’s wrong.” But then, why? “Because people 
should not be cruel to others.” But why? “Because you would not like it if she 
did that to you.” But what if I knew I would not get caught? “You shouldn’t 
do it anyway.” But why? “Because it’s wrong to hurt other people.” But why? 
“Because…” 
We know the feeling of being confronted with the “why?” question and 
not knowing what to say after “because…,” yet feeling we should be able to 
say something. There is that horrible ellipsis – how do we fill it in? We may 
                                                 
4 See FOGELIN, supra note 1, at 5 ("Debates concerning radical choices are carried on in a way 
that insulates them from the ordinary, workaday world."). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  4 
find ourselves saying, “that’s what I think” or “that’s how I feel” or “that’s just 
the way things are” – or even a circular “because it’s wrong.” Or perhaps we 
adopt the pragmatic approach and try to turn the tables by asking: “well, 
don’t  you  agree?”  But  these  answers  feel  unsatisfying;  there  seems  to  be 
something else we should be able to say, and it seems to be on the tip of our 
tongues – if we could only figure out what it was.
5 That is the problem: we 
have trouble finishing the “because clause"; reasons run out. 
As  a  law  professor,  I  have  noticed  this  problem  acutely  among  my 
students.  They  quickly  learn  to  make  sophisticated  arguments  about 
interpreting  precedent  and  statutes,  making  analogies  and  distinguishing 
cases,  debating  the  judicial  role  (active  or  restrained),  and  discerning  the 
advantages and disadvantages of rigid rules versus flexible standards. They 
also learn to use cost-benefit analysis, measuring the expected consequences 
of alternative rules of law in monetary values and adding up the costs and 
benefits  to  determine  which  rules  appear  to  maximize  social  welfare.  But 
when  I  ask  my  students  to  make  or  defend  arguments  based  on 
considerations of rights, fairness, justice, morality, or the fundamental values 
underlying a free and democratic society, they are mute. They get out the first 
sentence: "I have a right to use my property as I see fit" or "I have a right to be 
left alone." But then they go silent; they do not have a second sentence – they 
do  not  know  how  to  go  on.  Their  silence  is  partly  caused  by  their  not 
knowing what to say; they cannot figure out what vocabulary to use or  how 
to make the argument. But the underlying reason for this uncertainty is their 
fear that such arguments are merely matters of opinion that have no objective  
basis. They know that others can disagree and they feel they do not have way 
to defend their arguments or ground them. 
They do not  feel this away about cost-benefit analysis. Contemporary 
efficiency  analysis  is  the  contemporary  way  of  interpreting  and 
operationalizing  the  classical  consequentialist  normative  theory  of 
utilitarianism. It is attractive  to students (and professors) because it takes 
individual preferences for granted (thereby promoting individual autonomy), 
counts each person's interests equally (thereby promoting equal concern and 
respect  for  human  beings),  and  then  uses  math  –  the  most  objective 
procedure imaginable – to figure out how to maximize human welfare. It 
thus both appears to serve widely shared values (autonomy and equality) and 
to produce answers to complex questions through a process that is neutral 
and rational. 
                                                 
5 See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 9 (1997) ("Trying to 
explain why one pursues what one does take to be worth pursuing for its own sake ties the 
tongues of the most articulate."). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  5 
Most, but not all, students,  recognize that there are severe limitations to 
efficiency analysis. One problem is that many (I  would say  most)  human 
values cannot be adequately expressed in numerical or monetary terms. Nor 
do maximizing procedures give us any assurance that individuals will not be 
sacrificed for the greater good. For these reasons (among others), students 
need to able to make arguments that can express and defend claims of right 
and justice. My thesis is that we have no alternative but to make arguments 
that elaborate fundamental human values and which express our considered 
commitments  to  judgments  about  morality  and  justice.  Students  need  to 
know this because practicing lawyers need to know this; judges base their 
decisions partly on such considerations and the ability to make sophisticated 
arguments about justice and morality is a  basic skill all lawyers need. 
They will not find much help in the law reviews. Legal scholarship today 
has  limitations  when  it  comes  to  normative  argument.  Most  scholarship 
either  uses  economic  analysis  of  law,  traditional  doctrinal  analysis  that 
focuses  on  precedent  and  eschews  sustained  normative  argument,  critical 
analysis that reveals inconsistencies in the law or the arguments of others but 
refuses to make normative claims, or social science analysis that understands 
law from the outside, developing empirical information about how the world 
works. There is little work that looks at the law from the inside, asking, for 
example, how a judge should not only decide a case but justify the result to 
the public. How should the opinion be written? What, exactly, should it say?  
The normative work that one finds in the law reviews is often done at 
such a high level of abstraction (such as interpretations of the work of Rawls 
and Nozick) that it is not clear how to apply the analysis to particular legal 
disputes. Or it is so sophisticated, nuanced, and complex that it cannot easily 
generate  the  few  sentences  one  can  write  in  a  judicial  opinion.  Although 
scholars have the luxury of equivocation, the truth is that judges need such 
sentences; unlike theorists, judges decide cases and they need reasons to justify 
their choices.
6 Normative arguments are of crucial importance to the rule of 
law;  they  are  the  way  we  show  respect  to  the  losing  party  in  a  real  world 
dispute. Abstract theoretical work is important but it will not help judges and 
lawyers if they cannot figure out how to use it appropriately in real world 
situations. 
I believe it is a big problem if we are tongue-tied when asked to talk about 
fairness and justice. Growing up as I did during the civil rights era, I heard 
arguments  of  this  sort  all  the  time,  and  I  do  not  view  them  as  merely 
                                                 
6 See RICHARDSON, supra note 5, at 31 ("In being at least potentially expressible in words, a 
course of deliberation that is rational is one that can be assessed and explained, justified and 
criticized – publicly, it goes without saying"). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  6 
expressions of personal preference. They are, in effect, moral demands that 
can be, and must be, defended.
7 And there are better and worse ways of doing 
this. Both law professors and students are in need of advice about how to 
think about the nature of morality, fairness and justice.
8 More importantly, 
they need some vocabulary for talking about normative matters and a set of 
resources and methodologies for structuring relevant arguments. 
One way to move toward this goal is to look to moral and political theory 
and see what it can offer lawyers. As I will argue below, I believe this is an 
incredibly  useful  step  to  take.  We  lawyers  have  borrowed  liberally  from 
economic theory; it is time to extend our reach to political and moral theory 
in an equally sustained way. They provide some structure for thinking about 
the basic contours of institutions, laws, and practices in a just society – the 
social, legal, and institutional framework within which economic life goes on 
and efficiency analysis can legitimately be undertaken. Moreover, emerging 
schools  of thought  in both political and moral philosophy  have begun to 
create a middle path based on reviving the notion of practical  reason  – a 
conception of reason that turns out to be especially congenial to lawyers. It 
turns out that those of us in the "muddled middle" may not be so muddled 
after all; in fact, we may be sophisticated moral reasoners.  
For that reason, an alternative, equally fruitful, way to proceed is to look 
at what lawyers and judges actually do – to discern how we reason about 
morality  and  justice.  When  we  do  this,  we  will  learn  that  lawyers  have 
multiple,  sophisticated  methods  for  engaging  in  normative  argument. 
Lawyers are especially good at negotiating contradiction; we live in the world 
of hard cases where plural values reign and basic principles are inconsistent 
or in tension.
9 We have techniques for dealing with such situations that are 
                                                 
7  See  CHARLES  TAYLOR,  SOURCES  OF  THE  SELF  4  (1989)  (“strong  evaluation  …involve[s] 
discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered 
valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and 
offer standards by which they can be judged.”). 
8 I do not mean the word "nature" to suggest that there is a timeless natural law structure to 
such arguments. As a pragmatist, I see such arguments as grounded in human culture. The 
nature of normative argument changes (legitimately) over time and is relative, to some extent, 
to particular societies. This does not mean that we cannot make judgments about the values of 
other cultures, because I believe we can, at least about fundamental human rights. On students' 
need to learn how to talk about justice, see Peter L. Davis, Why Not a Justice School? On the 
Role of Justice in Legal Education and the Construction of a Pedagogy of Justice, 30 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 3 (2007). 
9  See  ANDERSON,  VALUE  IN  ETHICS  AND  ECONOMICS,  supra  note  3,  at  218  ("Commonsense 
ethical thinking is deeply pluralistic, contentious, embedded in social practices conceived in 
'think'  terms,  and  expressed  through  non-consequentialist  norms.  It  lacks  the  unity,  self-Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  7 
useful, illuminating, and productive. Moral and political theorists have much 
to teach lawyers, but lawyers are experts in applied practical reason, and we 
have much to teach moral and political theorists.
10  Indeed, I will argue that 
legal reasoning is, at base, a highly sophisticated form of moral reasoning. 
For some, the very concept of "moral reasoning" is an oxymoron. Reason 
is about things that everyone can and should agree upon, but in a democratic 
society, morality is precisely the thing that we do not agree upon. Just think 
about religion, abortion, same-sex marriage. Moreover, the idea of liberty is 
based on our ability to live our lives as we please; any attempt by government 
officials to tell us that our way of life is "wrong" is tyrannical. Yet, at the same 
time, it is obvious that we want to have government of some kind and that 
one of the functions of that government is to regulate our conduct so that we 
do not harm others in course of exercising our own liberties. Liberty is not 
anarchy but freedom within the bounds of the rule of law. We enlarge our 
liberty by laws that limit our liberty. I am free to walk the street knowing that 
you are prohibited from harming me. Yet because we live in an age of diverse 
viewpoints, we find it hard to agree on the kinds of harms that government 
should  prevent.  We  therefore  look  for  a  method  of  reasoning  that  can 
reconcile conflicting interests and worldviews without privileging one over 
the others. It is an open question whether this is possible. 
One path is to seek a neutral, rational decision procedure that both stands 
above (or outside) all these hard substantive disputes and is also sufficiently 
powerful to adjudicate them definitively. Such a stance may be substantive in 
nature  (based  on  utilitarian  or  deontological  reasoning)  or  it  could  be 
procedural  in  nature  (based  on  notions  of  democratic  governance  or 
separation of powers or the idea of a social contract among “free and equal 
persons”).
11  It  could  try  to  bridge  the  substance/procedure  divide  by 
reference to the idea that our moral claims fit together in a coherent package, 
                                                                                                                
evidence,  universality,  and  tidiness  many  philosophers  demand  of  theoretically  respectable 
claims.  But  the  very  features  of  commonsense  ethical  thinking  thought  to  constitute 
philosophical vices are indispensable for self-understanding. We need to think of values as 
plural to make sense of the variety of ways we have of valuing things. We need to contest their 
meanings to explore and cultivate our evaluative sensibilities. We need to think of valuations 
as embedded in social practices to make sense of their meaningfulness to others and their 
susceptibility to criticism and justification in dialogue with others."). 
10  For  two  very  different  accounts  of  the  nature  of  practical  reason,  see  ROBERT  AUDI, 
PRACTICAL REASONING AND ETHICAL DECISION (2006); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
HUMAN  SCIENCES;  PHILOSOPHICAL  PAPERS  2,  91–115  (1985);  Edward  C.  Lyons,  Reason's 
Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty, 55 ClEVELAND ST. L. REV. 157 (2007). 
11 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT §2, at 5 (Erin Kelly ed.) (2001).  Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  8 
thereby  mutually supporting each other in a  wide circle;  alternatively,  we 
could  appeal  to  tradition  or  our  “way  of  life”  or  precedent.  Whatever 
approach one adopts, the idea is to start from noncontroversial (or at least 
widely accepted) premises (whether universally applicable substantive norms, 
impartial procedures, or established practices) and then reason deductively 
or  analogically  from  those  agreed-upon  premises  to  find  answers  to 
controversial questions.  
These strategies are attractive, but critical analysis of such approaches 
reveals that they fail to solve the problem they were created to address. There 
is a pervasive fantasy that we can escape the need for normative argument, 
controversial  assumptions,  and  human  judgment  by  adopting  the  right 
decision procedure; but this is an illusion. The unavoidable fact is that no 
matter  how  hard  we  try  to  define  impartial  decision  procedures,  we  face 
persistent disagreement both about basic notions of what is good and right 
and just and about which procedures are suitably impartial. Our substantive 
premises wind up being contested and controversial, and we find that we 
cannot  define  “neutral”  procedures  without  resorting  to  controversial 
substantive judgments. Even our understanding of the facts is colored by our 
preconceptions about justice. Where a libertarian sees a voluntary contract 
between  self-governing  individuals,  a  liberal  critic  sees  an  oppressive 
imposition  of  grossly  unfair  terms  by  a  powerful  employer  on  a 
disempowered migrant farmworker. 
The problem recurs when we try to draw implications from the premises 
we have adopted. We may believe we have described impartial premises or 
procedures, but then we flounder when we try to derive answers from them. 
To identify seemingly noncontroversial premises, we have to state them at 
such a high level of generality that they wind up either being empty or too 
full of implications. We find that they are sufficiently abstract that we can 
deduce several alternative, competing solutions from them. No consistent set 
of  premises  seems  to  generate  a  complete  set  of  answers  to  normative 
questions; any complete set of premises will necessarily generate internally 
contradictory guidance. Life is too complicated to embody in a simple theory, 
and our moral impulses are too various, too situated, too contingent, and too 
complex to be derived from any single decision procedure.
12 
                                                 
12 ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY l (1969) (“The simple point which I am concerned to 
make is that where ultimate values are irreconcilable, clear-cut solutions cannot, in principle, 
be found. To decide rationally in such situations is to decide in light of general ideals, the over-
all pattern of life pursued by a man or a group or a society.”); see id. at li (“The need to choose, 
to sacrifice some ultimate values to others, turns out to be a permanent characteristic of the 
human predicament.”). See also FOGELIN, supra note 1, passim. Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  9 
We  face  a  dilemma:  If  we  make  our  normative  premises  sufficiently 
neutral, then they are too abstract to generate determinate answers, but if we 
make them sufficiently definite to solve the indeterminacy problem, we wind 
up sacrificing impartiality or neutrality. Determinacy and neutrality seem to 
be in tension with each other. We are then left with the same conflict we had 
before: the true believers cannot justify their non-neutral premises in terms 
that others can accept and the skeptics conclude that impartial premises and 
procedures do not exist, or that if they do exist, they are indeterminate. Either 
way,  we  are  left  with  the  problem  we  started  with;  claims  of  justice  and 
morality cannot be justified in an impartial manner acceptable to persons 
with different conceptions of the good. After all this, we appear to be no 
better off than before we tried to identify neutral procedures for normative 
reasoning. What to do then?  
We  could  give  up  and  join  the  cynics.  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
universe, any view is as good as any other; there are no built-in standards of 
justice or morality to which we can appeal or which we can “discover” by 
observation or introspection. Justice and morality are things we invent, and 
they  are  nothing  more  than  human  creations;  normative  arguments  are 
therefore inevitably defective if they claim an objective basis outside human 
choice.
13 The only alternative left is a “leap of faith.”
14 I’m for poor people and 
you’re for rich people and that’s just the way it is. You want environmental 
protection and I want “small government.” Are you with me or against me? 
On this view, persuasion is simply beside the point. Moral argument is not a 
matter of proof but of recruitment to a cause; it is based, not on reason, but 
emotional  attachment  and  irrational  faith.
15  One  simply  adopts  an 
existentialist stance, asserting what life means to us and inviting others to 
sign  onto  our  normative  projects.  There  is  no  way  to  defend  normative 
claims other than to describe them vividly, to present them as proposals for 
action,  as  invitations  to  participate  in  a  certain  form  of  social  life  –  an 
invitation one must accept or reject on essentially irrational (or nonrational) 
grounds. Alternatively, one may believe that persuasion is possible but that it 
occurs not through reason but sophistic rhetoric. What we need are smart 
Madison Avenue advertising executives, not arm chair theorists to help us 
convince others about right and wrong. 
16 
                                                 
13 Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990). 
14 JONATHAN LARSON, Leap of Faith, from RENT (musical play) (1996). 
15  On  the  importance  of  emotion  in  persuading  others  see  DREW  WESTEN,  THE  POLITICAL 
BRAIN (2007). 
16  RICHARD  RORTY,  CONTINGENCY,  IRONY  AND  SOLIDARITY  (1989)  (“[Moral]  dilemmas 
[involving  conflicting  moral  obligations]  we  shall  always  have  with  us,  but  they  are  never Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  10 
We  could  even  justify  this  cynical  resolution  by  comforting  ourselves 
with the idea that we have finally seen the light – there is no moral truth out 
there for us to latch onto; instead the moral truth lies in us. Protagoras was 
right  when  he  tried  to  convince  Socrates  that  “man  is  the  measure  of  all 
things”;
17 Nietzsche was right when he characterized conventional morality as 
an artificial constraint on human freedom.
18 Viewed in this way, the critical 
impulse  is  liberating:  it  allows  us  to  see  existing  ideologies  as  elaborate 
justifications for existing distributions of power, and seeing the impartial or 
indeterminate  nature  of  all  moral  systems  frees  us  from  their  evil  grip, 
allowing us to become what we wish to be. Human preference becomes the 
key, and the only question is what we want to desire. We will have some form 
of justice and morality and its content is in our collective hands – or in the 
hands of those powerful enough to impose their moral vision on the rest of 
us. 
There  is  a  problem  with  this  resolution  of  the  normative  question. 
Lawyers are perhaps more aware of what is problematic about it than anyone 
else.  The  problem  is  that  we  want  those  who  exercise  power  over  others 
(judges and legislators, for example) to defend public policies that affect the 
people regulated by those policies. We especially want reasons from judges 
who  are  supposed  to  be  acting  impartially,  treating  like  cases  alike,  and 
according each person equal concern and respect.
19 We do not like the idea of 
judges who simply say: “I’m in charge and this is how it is going to be.” But if 
we are not in agreement already, what reasons could be good enough? What 
can be said to the losing party to a  lawsuit that is  not just a transparent 
attempt to dupe her into accepting a painful loss? Why accept the result as 
anything other than the raw exercise of power? The cynic responds that our 
                                                                                                                
goingto be resolved by appeal to some further, higher set of obligations which a philosophical 
tribunal might discover and apply.”). See also RICHARD RORTY, Pragmatism, Relativism, and 
Irrationalism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 160–175 (1982). 
17 PLATO, PROTAGORAS (Adam Beresford trans., Penguin ed. 2006). See Robert Fogelin argues 
that Protagoras's maxim suggests that he adopted a "radical perspectivism." FOGELIN, supra 
note 1, at 73. However, it is possible to interpret the Protagoras view as based on sensitivity to 
the importance of human judgment in moral matters (as opposed to the more formal view 
espoused by Plato), much as Fogelin argues in his own work. 
18 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE 
(Walter  Kaufmann,  trans.  1966)(1886).  For  a  postmodern  variant  of  this,  see  ZYGMUNT 
BAUMAN, POSTMODERN ETHICS (1993). 
19 WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 4 (2nd ed. 2002) (noting the focus 
of almost all modern political philosophies in the fundamental assumption that "government 
treat  its  citizens  with  equal  consideration;  each  citizen  is  entitle  do  equal  concern  and 
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desire for adequate reasons does not mean that they are available. 
In  the  middle  (where  I  find  myself)  are  those  who  suggest  that  the 
problem  lies  in  a  cramped  and  unsuitable  conception  of  reason.
20  The 
reasoning methods appropriate to moral argument are not the same as those 
that are appropriate when doing a math problem. Nor are they the same as 
those one uses when looking for a cure for cancer. We should not expect 
algorithmic  formulas to solve our problems.
21 Rather,  human judgment is 
required.  How  do  we  make  these  judgments?  Traditionalists  (both 
conservative and liberal) suggest we elaborate the implications of our way of 
life  by  reference  to  tradition,  original  intent,  immanent  reason,  custom, 
precedent, evolving principle. Pragmatists, on the other hand, argue that law 
and  morality  are  human  institutions  designed  to  solve  human  problems. 
Because these problems are complex and because no pre-given answers are 
available,  they  propose  experimenting  to  find  out  “what  works.”  I  am 
sympathetic to these projects. At the same time, their pretense to transcend 
normative  debate  is  unconvincing.  After  all,  we  will  understand  our 
traditions  in  various  ways,  judge  our  customs  harshly  or  kindly,  reveal 
conflicting immanent principles. Nor can we talk about "what works" without 
some idea of what our problems are, how to understand them, and what it 
would look like to “solve” them. Normative argument is inescapable. 
How can we make normative arguments in a fragmented and skeptical 
age?  How  can  we  justify  legal  rules  that  bind  everyone  when  we  have 
fundamental disagreements about the nature of the good, and our methods of 
reasoning seem to embody, rather than transcend, those disagreements? If all 
our decision procedures turn out to be either incomplete or contradictory 
and  if  all  our  normative  frameworks  rest  on  controversial  and  contested 
values, do we have nothing left but existentialist leaps of faith? Is there a way 
to frame normative arguments that can give them sufficient persuasive force 
to  support  the  values  we  hold  dear  while  retaining  a  sophisticated 
understanding of the complexities and perplexities of human life in a diverse 
society  composed  of  individuals  with  vastly  different  conceptions  of  the 
good? Descending from the airy realm of political and legal theory to the day-
                                                 
20 See FOGELIN, supra  note 1,  passim; MARK TIMMONS, MORAL  THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(2002); STEPHEN TOULMIN, RETURN TO REASON (2001) (all arguing that such an approach is 
both possible and desirable). 
21 See RICHARDSON, supra note 5, at 32 ("not all rational deliberation from a given starting 
point need converge on a unique answer about what is to be done as the alternative required 
by reason"). For a brilliant account of moral reasoning in the face of insolvable dilemmas, see 
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND 
PHILOSOPHY (1986). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  12 
to-day  job  of  lawyering,  how  can  competent  lawyers  make  normative 
arguments when the need arises without engaging in sophistry (understood 
as  fallacious  arguments  intended  to  deceive)?
22  Is  normative  argument 
possible?  
Today the dominant answer is no. The main alternatives we find in the 
law  review  literature  are  doctrinal  analysis,  democratic  theory,  rights, 
efficiency, and  critical theory. Each  of these approaches seeks to avoid or 
contain  normative  argument  and,  as  I  will  explain  below,  each  fails.  The 
question is whether there is any alternative. I believe the answer is yes.
23 And 
I also believe that legal scholars are much in need of an articulated normative 
alternative to these approaches  – especially to the seductive attractions  of 
unsophisticated  versions  of  cost-benefit  analysis.    Moreover,  part  of  the 
impetus for this project is the need to explain to law students how to argue 
about justice and fairness in a manner that will cause a judge to listen to them 
and  take  them  seriously.  I  have  long  faced  the  challenge  of  answering 
students  who  want  to  know  how  to  fill  in  the  “because  clause.”  When  I 
demand that they explain why the plaintiff’s interest in sleeping outweighs 
the neighbor’s interest in holding a raucous, all-night party, they want a clue 
about how to go about answering this question. They deserve an answer from 
me. 
In §2, I will explain in more detail why lawyers cannot escape normative 
argument. I will show how  various approaches seek to avoid or set aside 
sustatined normative engagement and why these efforts fail.  
Section 3 will explore what lawyers can learn from (and teach) moral and 
political theorists. Legal methods are not merely watered down versions of 
                                                 
22 I add the caveat in parentheses because the word “sophistry” has come to mean the concept 
contained in those parentheses. It is not clear, however, that this is what the actual Sophists 
intended. Some recent scholars have argued that this view of the Sophists comes from Plato’s 
picture  of  them  –  or  perhaps  even  Aristophanes’  caricature  of  them,  and  that  the  actual 
Sophists had a sophisticated (not sophistic) view about the nature of truth and rationality that 
is superior to the Platonic theory of Forms. See FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III, RHETORICAL KNOWLEDGE 
IN LEGAL PRACTICE AND CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 36–41 (2006). My approach in this article is 
compatible  with  this  new,  approving  view  of  Sophistry  which  views  rhetoric  and  practical 
reason as means to justify law and morality in defensible ways. 
23 See FOGELIN, supra note 1, at 9 (arguing "that inconsistency does not always render a system 
useless, that consistency is not always the most important goal of inquiry, and that it might be 
wholly unreasonable to suppose that human beings will ever be able to attain a view of the 
world that is both suitably rich and completely consistent."); id. at 42 ("in practice, it is often 
quite  reasonable  to  employ  systems  of  rules  with  no  guarantee  that  they  are  consistent.… 
Sometimes the best available strategy is to learn to live with inconsistency in, as we might say, 
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more sophisticated theories; rather, lawyers have insights gleaned from the 
practical activity of law making and legal argument that enrich the methods 
typically used by moral and political philosophers.  
In  §  4,  I  will  describe  four  general  families  of  methods  that  lawyers 
employ  to  frame  normative  arguments  about  justice  including  (1) 
orientation,  (2)  evaluative  assertion,  (3)  contextualization,  and  (4) 
prioritization. First, we orient ourselves in a moral universe through basic 
assumptions about human nature, the good society, and social relationships. 
We also frame the particular issue that confronts us in a way that highlights 
our  underlying  moral  concerns  while  using  narrative  accounts  to  help  us 
come to understand the meaning of events, disputes, and situations.  
Second,  we  make  evaluative  assertions  that  identify  human  interests, 
wants,  needs,  and  preferences  that  count  as  human  values  that  deserve 
respect by others or which count as moral demands we make on each other. 
We do this in a variety of ways, including arguing about what it means to 
treat human beings with dignity, elaborating the values we hold dear, and 
analyzing responsibilities associated with defensible human relationships.  
Third, when values conflict, we seek to interpret those values, if possible, 
to  be  consistent  with  each  other  in  particular  cases  through  a  process  of 
contextualization,  which  may  involve  situational  framing,  restrained 
interpretation of values, and social and historical accommodation.  
Finally,  when  value  conflicts  cannot  be  avoided,  we  employ  various 
methods of prioritization to determine which of the values should prevail in 
particular cases. We do this by adopting a suitably impartial procedure to 
help  us  think  through  the  practical  problem  of  what  to  do  when  values 
conflict. Three of the most important procedures include balancing interests, 
contractualism, and reflective equilibrium.  
Part 5 concludes with thoughts on responsibility, as well as the necessity 
for and limitations of human judgment on matters of political morality and 
the rule of law. 
 
§ 2.0 WHY LAWYERS CANNOT ESCAPE NORMATIVE ARGUMENT 
 
§ 2.1 How conventional approaches fail to avoid normative engagement 
 
§ 2.1.1 The problem with doctrine 
 
Beginning law students are often surprised by many things in legal education. 
The first surprise for many students is that they generally learn the law, not 
by reading a rule book, but mostly by reading appellate opinions. The second Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  14 
surprise is how hard it is to apply the rules they learn to new cases; it turns 
out that rules do not determine the scope of their own application. The third 
surprise is how hard it is to apply rules even if their scope is clear. Often the 
rules themselves are ambiguous; they may contain vague terms or reference 
ultimate  standards,  such  as  good  faith  or  reasonableness,  that  require 
judgment  if  they  are  to  be  interpreted  and  applied.  Often  one  rule  may 
conflict  with  another  and  it  may  not  be  obvious  where  to  draw  the  line 
between them. In addition, a case may involve facts so different from those in 
which the rule has been applied in the past that prior law appears to give no 
answer  to  what  to  do  in  this  new  situation.  The  gaps,  conflicts,  and 
ambiguities  in  rules  are  far  broader  and  deeper  than  most  nonlawyers 
imagine. A final surprise is how much class time teachers spend on seemingly 
theoretical questions.  
 Why do we teach law this way? We do so because, as Karl Llewellyn 
explained, “[w]e have discovered that students who come eager to learn the 
rules and who do learn them, and who learn nothing more, will take away the 
shell and not the substance. We have discovered that rules alone, mere forms 
of words, are worthless.”
24 Because rules do not determine the scope of their 
own application, they cannot be understood apart from cases; their meaning 
is  clear  only  in  their  application.  The  ubiquity  of  gaps,  conflicts,  and 
ambiguities in the rules in force generates the need for argumentation based 
on policy and principle, as well as the invocation of analogy and situational 
context, in order to draw lines in hard cases. Students need to understand, 
not  only  the  instances  (fact  situations)  to  which  the  rules  apply,  but  the 
principles  and  policies  underlying  them;  the  applicability  of  a  rule  often 
depends on the context in which it is appropriate, as well as the purposes the 
rule is intended to serve, and those purposes inevitably include normative 
considerations. These considerations seem to be necessary ways to address 
complexity. If this is so, then a judge deciding a common law decision who 
sought to “apply law” rather than “make it” would have nothing to do. She 
might  as  well  go  home.  This  does  not  mean  that  judges  make  law  in  a 
vacuum,  or  in  an  unconstrained  manner;  it  does  mean  that  rules  do  not 
interpret  themselves  and  that  interpretation  is  an  inevitably  normative 
enterprise. 
Positivists seek to avoid this conclusion. Identifying law with commands 
of the sovereign, they emphasize the  distinction  between law and morals, 
drawing our attention to the fact that there is such a thing as an immoral law 
and that rules of recognition often point to indicators other than morality or 
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justice  to  define  the  rules  in  force.
25  One  might  think  that  this  approach 
allows  lawyers  to  eschew  normative  argument.  Unfortunately  (or  maybe 
fortunately) that is not the case. When we generate the holding of a case – 
describing the rule of law for which it stands – the teacher often confounds 
the class by changing one fact and asking if the rule applies to that changed 
context. Answering that question is often difficult. That is so because one 
changed fact may make it inappropriate to apply a rule that initially seemed 
to apply to the situation. Extension of the rule to the new case may seem 
unfair rather than fair, or the values promoted by the rule may clash with 
competing values. 
More fundamentally, although we do separate law and morals, we do not 
separate them entirely. Legal theorists sometimes ignore this reality. It is a 
fact  about  the  legal  system  in  the  United  States  that  judicial  reasoning 
includes  explicit  normative  considerations.  Most  opinions  include  some 
reasoning based on consideration of rights and social utility; they justify rule 
choices and interpretation of existing rules based on promoting the general 
welfare and protecting individual rights. Often, these arguments themselves 
are  based  on  explicit  conceptions  of  morality,  such  as  self-reliance  or 
altruism.    Negligence  law,  for  example,  is  premised  on  the  notion  that 
individuals have an obligation to act reasonably; moral conceptions are an 
explicit  part  of  determining  what  obligations  we  have  have  toward  each 
other. Many legal rules are indeterminate without reference to considerations 
of morality and justice. More importantly, we want and expect the law not 
only  to  be  regular  and  predictable  but  defensible  from  the  standpoint  of 
morality  and  justice.  We  expect  the  law  to  be  fair,  or  to  promote  social 
welfare, or to be consistent with human liberty and dignity. What we need 
are reasons to interpret precedents one way or the other. Law is justified and 
shaped, not just by reference to rules, tradition, custom, and precedent, but 
by reference to normative considerations. Or perhaps a better way to say this 
is that our legal rules, traditions, customs, institutions, and precedents are 
themselves partially defined by moral principles, norms, and conceptions of 
the just society. Normative concerns inevitably shape both social policy and 
interpretations  of  precedent.  For  these  reasons,  application  of  doctrine  is 
impossible without normative argument. 
 
§ 2.1.2 The problem with efficiency 
 
Utilitarian approaches seek to fill the need for normative argument in law in 
                                                 
25 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1861-1863); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
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a suitably impartial way. They do this by seeking to maximize social welfare 
by  adopting  rules  of  law  that  have  the  best  overall  consequences  for 
individuals  and  for  society  as  a  whole.  This  normative  approach  is  both 
consequentialist and maximizing. Utilitarianism is consequentialist because it 
judges  the  justice  of  legal  rules  by  reference  to  their  consequences.  What 
behavior will follow from these rules? What incentives will they create? What 
are their costs and benefits? Utilitarianism is maximizing because it judges 
fairness and justice by converting all consequences to some common metric, 
adding up the pluses and minuses for each person, treating  each person's 
interests equally in the calculus, and then seeking to promote the rules that, 
on  balance,  generate  the  maximum  amount  of  utility  for  all  persons  in 
society. 
Although  utilitarianism  is  clearly  a  normative  theory  –  and  only  one 
theory among several others – its proponents often feel that it is normatively 
thin in the sense that it  bases normative argument  on widely shared  and 
noncontroversial values and proceeds through a form of reasoning that is 
either self-evident or definitionally rational. If the premises of the theory are 
uncontroversial and the method of applying that theory to decide specific 
cases  is  both  determinate  and  widely  accepted,  then  we  can  either  avoid 
normative disputes or conclude that we have identified a decision procedure 
for normative argument that solves the problem of promoting justice in a 
multicultural world. 
Why might one believe that utility (or “cost-benefit analysis”) was the 
best answer to the normative problem? Since we care about how law affects 
people, it arguably makes sense to judge rules based on their consequences. 
One might believe that a minimum wage promotes human dignity, but if it 
turns out that imposition of a minimum wage results in firing all the poorest 
workers, we might well conclude that the law hurts the very people it was 
intended to protect. It is not much of a protection for human dignity to insist 
on regulations that harm human dignity; the lawmakers’ intent matters less 
than the effect on the people they are trying to help. In judging those effects, 
modern  day  utilitarians  tend  to  look  to  the  preferences  of  individuals  to 
determine whether consequences of rules are good or bad. By deferring to the 
views of individuals affected by law, we grant people autonomy to choose 
their own ends based on their own conceptions of the good and we thereby 
treat individuals with respect and we avoid paternalism. And by counting 
each person as one and only one when we aggregate all the good and bad 
effects  of  alternative  laws  to  come  up  with  the  laws  that  have  the  best 
consequences  overall,  we  treat  each  person  equally.  This  method  then 
appears to to respect the autonomy of individuals or treat them as, equal, Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  17 
free, self-actuating human beings. 
Attractive  as this approach  may seem, utilitarianism faces insuperable 
difficulties that undermine its claim to be a determinate, noncontroversial 
normative decision procedure. First, and most obviously, it is premised on 
the twin notions of autonomy and equality – autonomy because it defers to 
individuals’ conceptions of what is in their own best interest and equality 
because it attempts to count each person’s welfare equally. While these are 
widely shared values, they are hardly noncontroversial. Many people believe, 
for example, that morality is based on the word of God and that laws which 
contradict  God’s  law  are  inherently  unjust.  The  ultimate  goal  for  such 
persons is not autonomy but some form of virtue, defined as compliance with 
divine law. Others may believe that what matters most is not autonomy but 
social  justice  and  that  achieving  social  justice  often  requires  sacrificing 
individual freedoms. 
Second,  even  if  one  believed  that  autonomy  and  equality  were 
noncontroversial values, their meaning is contested in ways that utilitarians 
usually do not recognize. It is not obvious, for example, that the best way to 
promote autonomy is to satisfy people’s preferences, whatever they happen to 
be.
26  Most  moral  theorists  (and  some    economists)  argue  that  we  should 
defer,  not  to  actual  preferences,  but  to  idealized  preferences  –  those 
preferences individuals would have if they possessed perfect information and 
were choosing in a suitable institutional setting – one that might or might not 
correspond  with  our  current  institutions.
27  Further,  it  is  possible  that 
preferences  would  change  if  circumstances  changed.  Views  about  racial 
equality  have  changed  enormously  over  the  last  fifty  years.  Should  a 
utilitarian judge the net social value of the 1964 Civil Rights Act based on the 
preferences of persons living in 1964 or what persons in 1964 could or should 
have predicted their preferences would be in the future or should they focus 
on the preferences of persons as they are now in 2008 after that law has been 
in effect for so long?
28 
More  fundamentally, it is not  an uncontroversial  idea that  we should 
                                                 
26 KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 14 (noting the "preference-satisfaction" account of utility which 
assumes  that  "increasing  people's  utility  means  satisfying  their  preferences,  whatever  they 
are"); Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 15 19 (2003) (arguing that 
"we cannot infer choice from preference"); id. at 1542–1543 (distinguishing between a person's 
preferences and a person's interests, meaning "what is good for him"). 
27 See id. at 15–20. 
28  See  Louis  Kaplow  &  Steven  Shavell,  Fairness  v.  Welfare,  114  HARV.  L.  REV.  961,  1338 
(2001)("a long-run strategy designed to change preferences may make society as a whole, over 
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satisfy  all  human  preferences,  no  matter  what  they  are,  even  if  they  are 
carefully  considered.  Some  persons  may  prefer  to  be  cruel  and  may  even 
persist  in  this  desire  after  being  given  perfect  information  and  a  suitable 
decision making setting. To discount such other-regarding preferences, one 
either must assume that the preferences of those opposed to cruelty would, as 
an  empirical  matter,  outweigh  the  preferences  of  those  who  desire  to  be 
cruel,
29  or  one  has  to  count  certain  preferences  as  beyond  the  pale  –  as 
themselves  failing  to  be  consistent  with  the  injunction  of  respecting  the 
autonomy of other persons.
30  
In addition, it is not at all obvious that the best way to promote equal 
treatment  of  persons  is  to  count  their  utility  equally  and  aggregate  all 
individual preferences and follow whatever policy maximizes social utility.
31 
Suppose, for example, social utility is maximized by sacrificing the interests 
of a minority – say, by enslaving them. This problem is often dealt with by 
suggesting that the long run interests of society are improved by treating each 
person  with  dignity,  but  these  “predictions”  of  remote  effects  are  often 
unsupported  or  conveniently  shaped  to  accord  with  a  priori  intuitions.
32 
More importantly, we need not only a way to reach a normatively attractive 
ends but a reason (or set of reasons) to justify the path we have chosen. To 
                                                 
29 Mark Timmons calls this the "remote effects" argument. TIMMONS, MORAL THEORY, supra 
note 20, at 137-138. 
30 Will Kymlicka argues that utilitarianism is premised on the equality of persons and that it 
therefore cannot consistently value the preferences of individuals who desire to treat others in 
a manner that does not demonstrate equal concern and respect. KYMLICKA, , supra note 19, at 
26–32, 37–45. For a similar argument, see TIMMONS, MORAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 144-
147. 
31 See KYMLICKA, , supra note 19, at 87 ("The utilitarian idea of giving equal weight to each 
person's  preferences  has  some  initial  plausibility  as  a  way  of  showing  equal  concern  for 
people's welfare. But, on inspection, utilitarianism often violates our sense of what it is to treat 
people as equals, especially in its lack of a theory of fair shares."); RICHARDSON, supra note 5, at 
155  ("arguing  for  a  conception  of  rational  deliberation  of  ends  that  resists  the  lure  of 
maximization"). 
32 See ANDERSON, VALUE  IN ETHICS  AND  ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 68-69 (criticizing the 
failure of consequentialists to make qualitative distinctions among values and their tendency 
to avoid embarrassing conclusions suggested by their theory through convenient but dishonest 
devices like "rule consequentialism, slippery slopes, remote effects, and so forth"). See also id. 
at 89 ("These considerations [of remote effects, slippery slopes, and strategies of indirection, 
such as rule consequentialism] may generate the intuitively endorsed results, but they fail to 
expain  our  confidence  in  and  insistence  upon  them.  Why  should  we  be  so  confident  that 
remote effects and indirect strategies pan out the way consequentialists need in these cases, 
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argue that slavery is wrong because the preferences of those opposed to it 
outweigh the preferences of those who favor it is to give an irrelevant reason 
for abolishing slavery;
33 indeed, it is a reason that is offensive and which itself 
causes harm by suggesting that the dignity of some can be subordinated to 
the power of others if the balance of preferences works out that way. Because 
utilitarianism is based on treating persons equally, we would better promote 
this goal by tempering the maximization method with a principle of tolerable 
fair distribution of the costs and benefits of promoting social welfare. When 
we do this, normative complexity and normative argument are inevitable. 
Third, even if we accept the idea of deferring to preferences and using a 
social maximizing procedure, we still need to operationalize this approach by 
assigning  numerical  values  to  consequences  so  that  we  can  perform  the 
aggregating and maximizing functions. How do we do this? We do not have 
an easy metric by which to measure utility. Some utilitarians, like Jeremy 
Bentham, focus solely on happiness and unhappiness or pains and pleasures; 
others, like John Stuart Mill, differentiate among kinds of pleasures, rating 
some as of more value to human welfare or of higher quality than others.
34 
Whatever metric we choose, we then need to assign values to consequences 
so that we can aggregate and maximize. But we have no natural method for 
doing this; it is not as if pleasures and pains come in neat packages of “utils” 
that  have  a  built-in  numerical  value.  For  this  reason,  law  and  economics 
scholars have settled on market measures (dollar amounts) to assign values. 
But  dollar  amounts  are  hardly  uncontroversial.  We  must  choose  between 
offer  and  asking  prices  (the  amount  one  would  be  willing  to  pay  for 
something  given  one’s  existing  wealth  versus  the  amount  one  would  be 
willing to accept to give up something to another). We must choose whether 
to  assume  the  existing  distribution  of  wealth  or  some  hypothetical  (and 
perhaps more just – meaning more equal) distribution of wealth. After all, 
market values are determined not by willingness to pay but willingness and 
ability  to  pay.  Thus,  in  a  well-known  example,  it  is  clear  that  one  would 
probably decrease social utility rather than increase it by denying medicine to 
a poor person who cannot afford it rather than giving it to a rich person who 
can outbid the poor one but does not really need the medicine.
35 Economists 
are well aware of the decreasing marginal utility of money but most law and 
economics  scholars  are  insufficiently  attentive  to  the  ways  in  which  this 
reality  undermines  the  very  measures  they  use  to  calculate  the  effects  of 
alternative legal rules on human welfare. 
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Finally, it is not at all apparent either that all values can be reduced to 
quantitative  measures  or  that  the  most  rational  way  to  make  normative 
judgments about social issues is to aggregate individual preferences and then 
engage in a maximizing exercise.
36 Most human values cannot be adequately 
expressed in numerical (especially dollar) amounts. Nor is our ultimate goal 
always  to  maximize  particular  values;  often  our  goal  is  to  interpret  those 
values in  a suitable way so that they support a just framework for social life. 
Take the example of same sex marriage. If we go by current preferences, it is 
apparent that same sex marriage is very controversial in the United States. It 
is probably the case that more people are opposed to it than are in favor of it. 
Almost forty states have statutes banning it. Moreover, the intensity of views 
on both sides seems to be very high. But it is not at all clear that the right way 
to  analyze  the  question  of  whether  the  state  should  recognize  same-sex 
marriages is to defer to the preferences of individuals, or even to attempt to 
predict  what  individuals  would  want  a  hundred  years  from  now  if 
circumstances and values were to change. How do we value the interest in 
refusing  to  recognize  same  sex  marriages?  Is  there  a  market  measure  for 
this?
37  Do  we  go  by  intensity  of  preference?  More  fundamentally,  why  is 
maximizing  happiness  or  satisfying  preferences  the  right  way  to  solve  a 
problem like this, much less the best way? Isn’t part of the problem that some 
people have strong views about how other people should live (asking others 
either  to  refrain  from  same-sex  relationships  or  to  tolerate  and  live  with 
them) and that this is true whether we allow or prohibit same sex marriage? 
What do we do with these other-regarding preferences?
38 
In the real world, and especially in our legal system, we do not simply 
defer to individual preferences no matter what they happen to be. Even if we 
adopt utilitarianism as a normative method, we do not count all preferences; 
some preferences are simply intolerable, and do not enter into the calculus of 
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interests  engaged  in  by  conscientious  judges  and  legislators.  If  utility  is 
premised on both autonomy and equality, then perhaps we do not count the 
interests  of  racists  in  determining  whether  a  law  prohibiting  intentional 
discrimination  in  housing  is  a  good  law.
39  Perhaps  we  judge  certain 
preferences  as  denial  of  the  rights  of  others,  and  thus  excluded  from  the 
utilitarian calculus. For this reason, various scholars have proposed morally 
constrained  utilitarianism  which  uses  normative  argument  to  weed  out 
certain preferences before the utilitarian calculus begins.
40 
Nor,  in  the  real  world,  do  we  make  all  decisions  by  numerical, 
aggregative, and maximizing formulae.
41 Although we often find ourselves 
looking at the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, we do not 
uniformly act as if the only rational way to perform cost/benefit analysis is to 
assign numerical values to specific costs and benefits and then add them up 
to  see  how  the  calculus  comes  out.
42  Often,  we  consider  the  pluses  and 
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minuses of different courses of action and then make a considered judgment 
based on holistic consideration of all the relevant information. Mathematics 
is far from a noncontroversial way to engage in normative analysis. Indeed, 
when  a  question  involves  interpretation  of  human  values,  mathematics  is 
ordinarily an irrational  way to think about the matter. And if this is so, then 
arguments will ensue, not only about the numerical values of different costs 
and benefits but about the maximizing procedure itself. If we are shaping the 
legal and institutional framework of a suitable and defensible way of life, we 
need to make judgments about the contours of that way of life; maximizing a 
single value (even as innocuous a one as "human welfare") is not necessarily 
the  right  way  to  do  this;  certainly,  it  is  not  the  only  way.
43  Normative 
arguments are therefore inescapable in this form of reasoning. 
Cost-benefit analysis, especially its efficiency form, cannot avoid the twin 
charges that it rests on controversial premises and that derivation of specific 
legal rules from these premises cannot be accomplished in a mechanical or 
nondiscretionary  manner.  Normative  choices  cannot  be  avoided  in  the 
economic analysis of law. The question then is whether there is any viable 
alternative to the methodology of economics to engage in normative analysis. 
 
§ 2.1.3 The problem with rights 
 
One  obvious  alternative  to  efficiency  as  a  normative  framework  is  the 
elaboration of human rights and liberties. Arguments based on rights and 
duties  (deontological  approaches)  are,  in  one  sense,  obviously  based  on 
normative  considerations.  By definition, they rest on values, or  assertions 
about  good  and  bad,  right  and  wrong,  justice  and  injustice,  freedom  and 
oppression,  autonomy  and  servitude.  They  distinguish  legitimate  from 
illegitimate  interests;  they  judge  preferences,  rather  than  merely  defer  to 
                                                                                                                
Greenfield  &  John  E.  Nilsson.  Gradgrind's  Education:  Using  Dickens  and  Aristotle  to 
Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 Brooklyn Law Review 799 (1997). 
See  also  ANDERSON,  VALUE  IN  ETHICS  AND  ECONOMICS,  supra  note  3,  at  200  ("Cost-benefit 
analysis is properly committed to the view that people should be able to decide for themselves 
the values of different risks and to express their values in their choices. But it is mistaken in 
thinking that people can adequately and autonomously express all their valuations through 
market relations."). 
43 See ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 38 ("consequentialists 
recognize  only  one  frame  for  justifying  actions,  whereas  expressivists  recognize  different 
frames for different contexts.… [¶] … Because states of affairs have only a context-dependent 
extrinsic value, it doesn't make sense to globally maximize the value of states of affairs. This is 
as incoherent as trying to globally maximize the instrumental value of tools, apart from the 
contexts which give them any usefulness."). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  23 
them.
44 Similarly, arguments that start  from the  idea  of  liberty (especially 
libertarian  approaches)  need  to  define  the  scope  and  meaning  of  liberty; 
freedom of action is limited by the harm principle (the duty not to harm 
others) and some normative framework is needed to define what constitutes 
a legally cognizable harm.
45  
At  the  same  time,  most  rights  theorists  seek  to  avoid  or  contain 
normative argument by trying to step above it in some way through decision 
procedures  which  are  intended  to  develop  determinate  answers  to 
controversial  questions  by  reference  to  noncontroversial  premises  or 
foundational nonmoral facts. Some scholars do this by creating presumptions 
against regulation (as in libertarian approaches to rights) and some do this by 
explicit reference to idealized preferences, filtered through a suitable decision 
making  setting  like  a  hypothetical  bargain,  constitutional  convention,  or 
social contract (Rawlsian analysis). 
As a practical matter, these efforts are unlikely to be successful. One need 
only  observe  the  division  of  the  country  between  Republicans  and 
Democrats,  religious  groups  and  secularists,  as  well  as  division  among 
academics on moral, legal, and political theory, to conclude that it is unlikely 
to be the case that we have identified a noncontroversial, determinate method 
for adjudicating normative disagreement. Rights arguments wind up being 
either  indeterminate  or  controversial,  no  matter  what  form  one  adopts  – 
separation of the right and the good (classical liberalism), derivation from 
foundational  human  interests  (foundationalism)  or  the  requirements  of 
reason (Kantianism),  elaboration of a suitable setting for creating a social 
contract (contractualism) or mutual entailment of principles in a coherent 
whole  (coherentism),  or  reflective  equilibrium  between  intuitions  about 
particular  cases  and  governing  principles.  Again  and  again,  we  face  the 
problem of the tension between determinacy and neutrality. Principles and 
decision procedures that are sufficient robust to actually decide specific cases 
turn out to be controversial, while noncontroversial premises are too abstract 
to generate determinate answers to hard cases. 
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It is also unlikely that we can identify theoretically satisfying decision 
procedures  that  will  avoid  the  need  to  make  normative  arguments  or  to 
engage  in  persuasion.  Traditional  liberal  political  theory  seeks  to  avoid 
normative controvery by identifying a decision procedure that can develop 
principles of right that can shape and ground the basic political and legal 
institutions  of  a  free  and  democratic  society  in  a  manner  that  allows 
individuals  to  pursue  what  John  Rawls  called  their  own  “comprehensive 
philosophical moral doctrines” (principles of the good).
46 Rawls developed 
the idea of public reason to capture this goal of separating the right and the 
good.
47 The idea of public reason  is an attractive one. Governments  have 
historically  oppressed  individuals  by  coercively  and  violently  imposing  a 
particular religion on them. We value individual liberties which encompass 
both freedom of conscience and the ability to choose our own ends, to live 
our own life on our own terms, and to form associations with others of oiur 
own choosing. We hope to create basic social and governmental institutions 
that we could accept despite our differing conceptions of the good. 
Attractive as the idea of separating the right and the good may be, it faces 
pervasive and probably insurmountable problems, not only in practice but in 
theory,  as  well.  Michael  Sandel  has  argued  that  conceptions  of  the  right 
cannot be completely divorced from conceptions of the good, if indeed they 
can be separated at all.
48 Sandel sometimes goes so far as to argue that our 
normative arguments must be based squarely on elaborating a conception of 
the good that could be supported by everyone and that principles of right are 
simply unavailable if they are not based on a moral conception of the good.
49 
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Whether or not this latter point is correct, it does seem to be true that we 
cannot completely separate the right from the good and that attempts to do 
so inevitably privilege some conceptions of the good over others and rest on 
values that have their source and justification in basic moral commitments 
that emerge from individual conceptions of the good.  
Lawyers are more aware of this truth than anyone else. We know, as a 
matter of fact, that our legal system rests on arguments that directly involve 
conceptions of the good. Case analysis, opinion writing, and legal argument 
all  involve  and  require  lawyers  to  make,  defend,  and  criticize  arguments 
based  on  both  rights,  morality,  and  social  utility  in  common  law 
adjudication.  It is true that during the  Lochner era,  many judges and  law 
professors  entertained  the  fantasy  that  the  entire  legal  system  could  be 
reduced to a few basic principles and that the specific rules of the common 
law could be deduced from those widely accepted premises.
50 But the legal 
realists destroyed our confidence in our ability to use deductive logic to play 
out  the  necessary  logical  implications  of  concepts  such  as  freedom  of 
contract,  negligence,  and  property.  Instead,  judges  balance  competing 
interests and justifying the balances they make, judges make arguments that 
are partly, if not wholly, based on notions of the good and not just the right. 
For  example,  the  question  of  whether  a  owner  should  be  able  to  take 
advantage of the adverse possession doctrine when he knowingly and in bad 
faith placed his fence two feet onto his neighbor's property is an issue that 
cannot be resolved without reference to controversial moral considerations. 
The concept of private property is compatible with various answers to this 
question. For this reason, lawyers are acutely aware that Rawls was wrong to 
think that one could just look at basic institutions in setting principles of 
right.  The  common  law  governs  many  social  interactions  that  go  beyond 
what Rawls thought of as “basic institutions” and moral conflict involving 
competing conceptions of the good goes all the way down. The details of the 
legal rules governing social life cannot be defined by deduction or mechanical 
derivation  from the nature of basic institutions or  concepts  or rules.  Our 
common law system defines those legal rules partly by reference to moral 
considerations, and it is not clear that our legal system could operate at all if 
it put these controversial moral arguments off the table. 
This does not mean that analysis of rights, liberties, and duties should not 
be part of the answer to the normative problem. Nor does it mean that we 
should not be concerned with trying to find approaches to justifying legal 
rules  that  could  be  accepted  by  people  who  adhere  to  very  different 
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(reasonable) comprehensive moral theories. It does mean that we need to be 
realistic about our ability to reason about the nature of rights in a manner 
that avoids, settles, or sets aside debates about morality and justice. We need 
other  methods  to  elaborate  reasons  that  can  justify  rule  choices  and 
institutional  settings  for  a  free  and  democratic  society  characterized  by 
widespread disagreements about  morality. We are  unlikely to  find a rigid 
decision procedure that will be decisive in answering questions about what 
the law should be; we are also unlikely to develop methods of analysis that 
eschew  all  moral  considerations.  Both  our  procedures  for  answering 
normative questions and the reasons we give to justify the rules we enforce 
are likely to involve controversial premises and a reasoning process that is far 
from  a  mechanical  one.  We  need  a  form  of  normative  argument  that 
recognizes the complexity and plurality of our values and which allows for 
forms  of  moral  reasoning  and  justification  that  are  based  on  argument, 
persuasion, and rhetoric and not just logic.
51  
 
§ 2.1.4 The problem with democracy 
 
Democratic  theory  defines  appropriate  institutions  and  social  decision 
making procedures to ensure that decisions can be defended as chosen by the 
people  or by their legitimately chosen representatives through democratic 
processes.
52  On  the  judicial  front,  most  theories  of  this  type  counsel  a 
subordinate  role  for  judges,  suggesting  they  leave  most  controversial 
questions  of  social  policy  to  the  legislature.  Or  these  theories  suggest 
following the rules – applying the law, rather than making it. And when the 
law is unclear, there is a preference for “deregulation,” understood to mean 
increasing the range of freedom of action, even if this free action allows some 
to harm others.
53 However, other approaches defend judicial activism, partly 
on the ground that the law develops in a dialogue between legislatures and 
courts and that each institutional setting reveals normative truths in a way 
that  is  unavailable  in  the  other  setting.
54  For  example,  legislation  is  often 
directed to solving particular social problems and the wording  of statutes 
may  fail  to  deal  adequately  with  particular  situations  that  are  not  the 
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exemplary cases in relation to which the legislature framed the statute. Courts 
confront the facts of particular cases, responding to particular conflicts, and 
may understand the normative limitations of general legislative principles in 
ways that were not obvious to legislators acting in a planning capacity.
55 Thus 
a court may be understandably reluctant to apply a statute providing that a 
joint tenant succeeds to the ownership interest of his co-owner when she dies 
if the reason she died is because her co-owner murdered her.
56 The legislature 
may not have been thinking about murder of one owner by another when 
they drafted the general law and might be happy for the court to conclude 
that the statute was never intended to apply in such a case.
57 At the same 
time,  other  theorists  may  believe  that  the  court  should  apply  the  statute 
mechanically and leave it to the legislature to create an exception for murder. 
Such choices of approach mean that democratic theory can provide guidance 
for judges only when coupled with a normative framework about both the 
nature, shape, and contours of democracy and the proper relations among 
different branches of government.  
More  to  the  point,  when  adjudicating  an  issue  of  common  law, 
“deference to the legislature” is hardly a solving formula, given the judge's 
power  and responsibility to interpret precedent and  enforce common  law 
rights. The common law simply does not work mechanically; the process of 
distinguishing cases means that state judges applying common law cannot 
consistently refuse to find legal rights merely because the legislature has not 
previously created them. The question is always why the precedents of the 
common law should be interpreted the way the defendant wishes (giving her 
freedom of action) rather than as the plaintiff wishes (regulating conduct to 
provide security). It is not possible to reserve all "policy" questions for the 
legislature on the pretense that the courts can interpret the common law in a 
neutral, value-free way. 
 
§ 2.1.5 The problem with critique 
 
Finally,  normative  argument  is  inescapable  even  for  deconstructionists, 
critical theorists, and postmodernists who might seek to avoid it entirely. It is 
easy for the armchair theorist to say that normative argument is inescapably 
circular,  indeterminate,  controversial,  misleading,  and  ungrounded,  or  to 
argue that complete justice is impossible. We can sit in our offices and seek to 
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explain and tear apart arguments made by law makers without attempting to 
say what we would have done in their place. But it is not so easy for judges 
and  legislators  to  refuse  to  engage  in  normative  argument.  A  judge  who 
decided  a  case  by  flipping  a  coin  or  without  considering  competing 
considerations carefully would be justly criticized as acting in an oppressive 
manner.  We  demand  that  judges  think  carefully  about  their  exercises  of 
power. More importantly, we demand that judges give reasons to explain how 
they  have  exercised  their  power.  Understanding  that  all  reasons  can  be 
criticized,  undermined,  countered,  and  dissected  does  not  remove  the 
normative and political demand that such reasons be given. Even if reasons 
cannot be given that are airtight, we still want power holders to give them. 
And we especially want judges to give them. 
The  fact  that  there  are  no  "killer  arguments"  that  definitively  resolve 
normative  conflicts  does  not  mean  that  all  arguments  are  therefore 
ideological window dressing. The arguments we give for and against different 
rules of law are based on considerations we in fact care about. Our inability to 
prove that we are right does not remove the need to justify ourselves. Nor 
does our desire to rest our normative claims on secure foundations protect us 
from the need to justify our actions and our laws even when it turns out that 
such foundations do not exist.
58 The inability to generate a noncontroversial, 
determinate decision procedure for normative conflicts does not obviate the 
need to engage in normative reasoning or argument. We need methods other 
than  an  axiomatic  decision  procedure  to  fill  in  the  "because"  clause.  And 
perhaps most surprisingly, it turns out that lawyers do have a special skill set 
and specialized knowledge that can aid both moral and political philosophers 
in doing exactly this. 
 
§ 2.2 Living in moral space  
 
§ 2.2.1 The limitations of analytical methods 
 
The  legal  realists  demonstrated  the  limitations  of  traditional  doctrinal 
analysis.  They  showed  that  general  principles  could  not  generate  detailed 
rules  in a non-discretionary  fashion; nor  could the  concepts contained in 
those principles or in the resulting rules be specified without engaging in 
judgments  of  both  policy  and  principle.  Some  realists  reacted  to  these 
demonstrations  by  rejecting  the  utility  of  legal  doctrine  altogether;  they 
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suggested that rules and doctrinal categories give us no help or guidance – 
indeed,  they  have  negative  utility  because  they  hide  the  real  policy 
considerations  underlying the rules.  Similarly, some  moral theorists today 
advocate a form of "particularism" which asserts that moral rules have no real 
role to play in moral reasoning; rather, particular facts and contexts must be 
considered to determine the right thing to do in any situation.
59 
Law and economics scholars have similarly turned their attention away 
from legal doctrine and moral principles, instead trying to using cost-benefit 
analysis,  among  other  approaches,  to  identify  rules  that  maximize  social 
welfare. Several professors at Harvard Law School have responded to the legal 
realist critique of doctrine by developing a course called "Analytical Methods 
for Lawyers" now enshrined in a coursebook of the same name.
60 In the place 
of  legal  doctrine,  the  text  suggests  solving  legal  problems  by  using  basic 
business and economic concepts and methods of analysis, such as decision 
theory,  game  theory,  information  theory,  contracting  theory,  accounting, 
finance, statistics, microeconomics, and law and economics.
61  
As I have explained, useful as they may be for certain kinds of questions, 
there are built-in limitations to these "analytical methods." At their best, they 
are incomplete as decision procedures for choosing appropriate courses of 
action; at worst, they are misleading and distorted. They presume that all 
relevant values can be reduced to monetary values (or at least are measurable 
in some way). Yet this is clearly not true. Even if the analysis recognizes that 
not all values can be reduced to dollar values, any values which cannot be so 
expressed  are  generally  omitted  from  the  analysis.  But  the  result  of  the 
analysis is usually enthroned as the "welfare-maximizing" result despite the 
incompleteness of the analysis. Moreover, the assumption appears to be that 
justice-based  goals,  such  as  distributive  fairness,  must  be  achieved  by 
sacrificing social welfare. I have argued, in contrast, that economic analysis 
cannot  itself  be  applied  analytically  without  making  controversial 
assumptions about fundamental values. With different baseline assumptions, 
the  analysis  would  come  out  very  differently.  And  one  cannot  define  a 
legitimate baseline without considering normative questions involving things 
like distributive justice. Further, because many important values cannot be 
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reduced to numbers, an adequate normative method would include methods 
of  reasoning  and  justification  that  are  outside  the  scope  of  the  methods 
described in Analytical Methods for Lawyers. 
Law makers also need to articulate acceptable reasons for a rule choice 
that can explain to the losing party why the result is fair and just. Cost-benefit 
analysis  suffers  from  the  limitations  of  all  utilitarian  reasoning;  it  fails  to 
respect the separateness of persons because it assumes that the gains of some 
can fully offset the losses of others. A judge cannot explain a decision this 
way.  From  an  external  perspective,  it  may  seem  sensible  to  say,  "We 
considered your claim but concluded that the social costs of ruling in your 
favor outweigh the social benefits." The problem is that the losing party will 
hear this argument to mean: "We decided to sacrifice your interests for the 
good of the community." This is not an adequate argument; it does not treat 
individuals with equal concern and respect. We need ways of reasoning and 
methods of justification that go beyond these methods. These economically-
oriented  analytical  methods  for  lawyers  need  to  be  supplemented  by 
normative methods for lawyers. 
 
§ 2.2.2 Moral reasoning: "as much clarity as the subject matter allows" 
 
I  have  argued  that  we  have  many  reasons  to  avoid  normative  argument. 
Normative disagreement seems fundamental and permanent and we have no 
apparent noncontroversial  methods for choosing among competing  moral 
views. But I have also argued that normative argument is unavoidable in a 
legal system in a free and democratic society. Nor should we want to avoid it. 
Judges need presentable and persuasive ways to argue about justice, fairness, 
and morality. Lawyers need the ability to do this, as well, not only to give 
persuasive arguments to judges, but to be able to interpret existing law.  
Contrary  to  the  assumptions  underlying  much  current  efficiency 
analysis, not all preferences can or should be indulged and not all preferences 
can be given equal weight. And when we reject a preference, we should be 
able to explain why. When we raise some interests to the level of fundamental 
values, we should be able to justify this. The language of justice grows out of 
the human impulse to give reasons for our claims, to justify the demands we 
make on others.
62 We want to say something other than “I prefer that you 
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stop  torturing  that  man”  or  “I  have  a  taste  for  treating  other  people 
respectfully” or even “the costs of torturing that man outweigh the benefits.” 
We want to say something other than “come play for our team.” We feel 
entitled to make moral demands on each other; we believe some political and 
legal systems, and some legal practices, are inherently unjust. We want to say 
– without irony – that “torture is wrong” and “people deserve to be treated 
with dignity” – and we would like to be able to say why. We especially want 
to be able to give good reasons for imposing laws on those who may disagree 
with the values underlying the laws. Is there really anything wrong with this 
impulse? 
I would say not. As Charles Taylor explains, “It is a form of self-delusion 
to think that we do not speak from a moral orientation that we take to be 
right. That is a condition of being a functioning self, not a metaphysical view 
we can put on or off.”
63 We need to be able to talk more cogently about our 
moral values, but in order to do so, we may need to give up the artificial 
constraints  on  moral  reasoning  that  we  had  unconsciously  imposed  on 
ourselves.
64  If  it  is  not  possible  to  identify  neutral,  determinate  decision 
procedures for reasoning about values, then perhaps our idea of what reason 
entails in the realm of normative argument was misplaced. Perhaps reason 
can coexist with controversy; perhaps reason manages disagreement without 
abolishing it.
65 Perhaps normative arguments are not an enclosed deductive, 
self-evident system but a form of practical reason, a means of living in the 
world, rather than a theoretical construct.
66  
                                                                                                                
only to our own considered convictions, but also to those of others . . . .”). 
63 TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 7. at 99. 
64 LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 92 (2005)("A 
decision is not a proof; it does not afford certainty, and reasonable persons may disagree. But 
in law, as in human affairs generally, a proof is not to be had."); Martha Nussbaum, Valuing 
Values: A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 197, 202 (1994) ("getting rid 
of transcendent standards does not mean getting rid of good reasons"). 
65 FOGELIN, supra note 1, at 59-60 ("Reflecting on certain features of a situation can trigger our 
deontological instincts; reflecting on other features can trigger our consequentialist instincts. 
Sometimes—perhaps even usually—these instincts support each other. Sometimes, however, 
they conflict. These, I think, are simply facts about our moral life. The thought that there must 
be some unifying source for our moral instincts—one that shows their underlying coherence—
strikes me as wholly unlikely on its face."); ERIC MACGILVRAY, RECONTRUCTING PUBLIC REASON 
155  (2004)  (arguing  that  we  should  not  assume  that  public  reason  requires  moving  from 
uncontroverial – and possibly empty – premises to controversial – and substantively charged – 
conclusions). 
66  See  TOULIMIN,  supra  note  20  (arguing  to  recreate  a  sense  of  the  reasonable  rather  than 
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If  so,  how  do  we  reason  about  normative  matters?  Charles  Taylor 
suggests we can gain traction by “articulating” what he called our “strong 
evaluations”
67 and our “moral frameworks.”
68 "Strong evaluation … involves 
a  standard,  independent  of  my  own  tastes  and  desires,  which  I  ought  to 
acknowledge.”
69  Articulating  such  strong  evaluations  helps  us  better 
understand our deep, and possibly unconscious, beliefs and assumptions; it 
also allows us to see their complexity and to criticize and improve them. The 
complexity that emerges in this process gives us reason to reject the idea that 
normative reasoning either appeals to “self-evident truths” or is based on 
mechanical, logic-driven decision procedures.  
Long ago Aristotle argued that we cannot expect exactitude in the realm 
                                                                                                                
 
“If you want to discriminate more finely what it is about human beings that makes them 
worthy of respect, you have to call to mind what it is to feel the claim of human suffering, 
or what is repugnant about injustice, or the awe you feel at the fact of human life. No 
argument can take someone from a neutral stance towards the world, either adopted from 
the demands of ‘science’ or  fallen into as a consequence of  pathology, to insight into 
moral ontology. But it doesn’t follow from this that moral ontology is a pure fiction, as 
naturalists  often  assume.  Rather  we  should  treat  our  deepest  moral  instincts,  our 
ineradicable sense that human life is to be respected, as our mode of access to the world in 
which ontological claims are discernible and can be rationally argued about and sifted.” 
 
TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 7, at 8. Accord, KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 44 ("The 
question is which form of equal treatment best captures the deeper ideal of treating persons as 
equals.  That  is  not  a  question  of  logic.  It  is  a  moral  question,  whose  answer  depends  on 
complex  issues about the  nature of human beings  and their interests and relationships. In 
deciding which particular form of equal treatment best captures the idea of treating people as 
equals, we do not want a logician, who is versed in the art of logical deductions. We want 
someone  who has an understanding of  what it is about humans that deserves respect and 
concern, and of what kinds of activites best manifest that respect and concern."). 
67  TAYLOR,  SOURCES  OF  THE  SELF,  supra  note  7,  at  4  (“strong  evaluation  …involve[s] 
discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered 
valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and 
offer standards by which they can be judged.” 
68 TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing the importance of “articulating” 
and thus “making sense” of the “background picture lying behind ourm oral  and spiritual 
intuitions.”);  see  id.  at  3–52  (generally  discussing  the  role  and  importance  of  moral 
frameworks). 
69 TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 7, at 4. See also TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND 
LANGUAGE, supra note 44, at 3 (defining a "strong evaluation" as "a background of distinctions 
between things which are recognized as of categoric or unconditioned or higher importance or 
worth, and things which lack this or are of lesser value."). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  33 
of  moral  reasoning;  the  nature  of  the  subject  prevents  it.  He  began  his 
Nichomachean Ethics by noting that “[o]ur discussion will be adequate if it 
has as much clarity as the subject-matter allows…”
70 Perhaps we need to give 
up, or at least relax, our expectation that normative argument should derive 
the  answers  to  hard  questions  from  uncontroversial  premises,  or  our 
expectation that neutral procedures can be wholly divorced from substance, 
or our expectation that what we need are decision procedures that generate 
answers in a mechanical or deductive fashion.
71 Perhaps what we need are 
structures  of  normative  reasoning  that  recognize  the  inevitability  both  of 
controversial  normative  premises  and  procedures  and  the  need  for 
contextualized  human  judgment  to  apply  those  normative  methods  to 
concrete cases.
72 
Yet giving up the idea of an orderly, self-proving moral system raises the 
possibility of self-delusion and false legitimation. What we seek are legitimate 
justifications of normative choices; what we fear are attractive arguments that 
legitimate oppression.  We are aware that  we can talk ourselves into doing 
horrible  things.  How  do  we  engage  in  justification  and  avoid  oppressive 
legitimation? If competing moral claims seem relevant in a particular case, 
and  we  do  not  have  a  noncontroversial  method  to  solve  the  battle  of 
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71 As Isaiah Berlin argued in a radio address in 1957: 
 
The arts of life—not least of politics—as well as some among the human studies turn out 
to possess their own special methods and techniques, their own criteria of success and 
failure…  Bad  judgment  here  consists  not  in  failing  to  apply  the  methods  of  natural 
science, but, on the contrary, in over-applying them… To be rational in any sphere, to 
apply good judgement in it, is to apply those methods which have turned out to work best 
in it… [To demand anything else] is mere irrationalism. 
 
Isaiah Berlin, quoted in TOULMIN, supra note 20, at viii. 
72 See FOGELIN, supra note 1, at 61-62 ("It is essential to see that an irreconcilable moral conflict 
can  exist  without  bringing  all  morality  down  around  it.…  Thinking  otherwise  is  almost 
certainly  the  result  of  placing  ultrarationalist  demands  on  moral  systems.  They  are  either 
dilemma-free or wholly arbitrary. A leading aim of this work is to break the spell of thinking of 
that kind."); KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 44-45 ("What we have in political argument is not a 
single  premises  and  then  competing  deductions,  but  rather  a  single  concept  and  then 
competing conceptions or interpretations of it. Each theory of justice is not deduced from the 
ideal of equality, but rather aspires to it, and each theory can be judged by how well it succeeds 
in that aspiration."); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 7, at 7 (arguing that 
modernity  has  inherited  “a  deeply  wrong  model  of  practical  reasoning,  one  based  on  an 
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competing  norms,  then  we  have  no  choice  but  to  rely  on  contextualized, 
carefully  considered  human  judgment.  We  work  within  a  tradition, 
developing  both  high-level  and  low-level  norms  of  interpretation, 
argumentation, justification, and defense. But retreat to notions of “craft” or 
“expertise” or pronouncements by “experts” that certain arguments are not 
“sound” inevitably appears to the losing side to be mere assertions of power – 
words designed to get the loser to shut up rather than reasons that could be 
accepted  as  legitimate  if  not  persuasive.  It  is  so  easy  to  slip  into  a  self-
justifying stance, convincing ourselves that we are in the right when we are 
actually doing wrong. 
This worry is real but the remedy it suggests is misconceived. We should 
worry about self-delusion and the unfair treatment of others. But the remedy 
for this worry is not to go back to the failed strategy of seeking to identify 
noncontroversial premises or pretend that the premises we do adopt generate 
answers in a mechanical or logical manner. Nor is the remedy to give up on 
the idea of pursuing justice. Neither of these extreme response solves our 
problem.  The  real  remedy  is  to  continue  to  worry.  We  do  this  by 
acknowledging  the  need  for  argument,  and  the  need  to  give  reasons 
addressed to the losing side. We do this by attending to the arguments on both 
sides, to seeing the case from someone else’s point of view. We cannot avoid 
the problem of talking ourselves into injustice by giving up on the idea of 
justice. The absence of clear, noncontroversial decision procedures does not 
make normative argument impossible or pointless or self-deluding.
73  
Reason in the realm of values must attend to the fact that human beings 
are “self-interpreting creatures” and that we are as much the source as the 
object  of  our  normative  claims.
74  The  skeptics  are  right  that  normative 
argument requires controversial claims even to get off the ground and that 
any set of reasons is likely to be both incomplete and inconsistent. Yet they 
are  wrong  to  conclude  that  this  makes  such  arguments  meaningless  or 
inherently  obfuscatory.
75  Normative  arguments  express  what  we  value  but 
they do more than this. The reasons we give to support moral claims are not 
just reports of preferences or tastes; rather, they are both "felt obligations" 
                                                 
73 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 11, at 30 ("Many of our most serious conflicts ar 
conflicts  within  ourselves.  Those  who  suppose  their  judgments  are  always  consistent  are 
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74 See generally KEITH TOPPER, THE DISORDER OF POLITICAL INQUIRY (2005). 
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and demands we feel entitled to make of each other.
76 As moral demands, they 
possess a different status and character than  mere preferences. Moreover, 
reasons can have weight even if we lack a completely coherent framework 
that determines their relative strength and applicability. Our lack of such a 
mechanical decision procedure does not require us to give up the idea of 
reason altogether. It does require us to frame our arguments in ways that are 
respectful of differences among persons with regard to conceptions of the 
good and attentive to the ways in which we are shaping our arguments as 
much as being shaped by them. We may not have access to Reason with a 
capital “R” (or what Stephen Toulmin calls “rationality”) but we have the 
capacity to give reasons to justify our claims on each other (what Toulmin 
calls “reasonableness”)
77 – and we have, or should have, the capacity to be 
moved by reasons given by others. 
Lawyers need to know how to do this. Normative argument is not just 
something that philosophers think about in the privacy of their offices; it is 
not  merely  the  stuff  of  academic  conferences  and  papers.  Lawyers  make 
normative arguments every day. These arguments are especially important in 
the context of common law development. For better or worse, it is a fixed 
part of our  legal system to  give reasons to support  proposed rules of  law 
when the rules in force are uncertain, or contain a gap, conflict, or ambiguity. 
When we argue about what the law is, we inevitably allude to what it should 
be; whether one is a supporter of natural law or positivism, it is a feature of 
our legal system to justify legal rights by appeal to normative considerations. 
Moreover, one can do better or worse at this project. The fact that one 
can often write a brief on both sides of a legal question does not mean that all 
briefs are equally good. As Francis Mootz notes: 
 
Many first year law students are troubled by what they perceive to be the 
wide freedom of judges to decide cases on personal whim and then later to 
supply adequate legal justification for their decision, but it is no surprise to 
find  that  these  same  students  have  difficulty  formulating  a  coherent 
argumentative essay for the final exam. It is easy enough to believe that the 
law is “just rhetoric” when reading a case, but the tremendous challenge of 
confronting a specific legal dispute and arguing persuasively on behalf of a 
                                                 
76 On "felt obligations," Charles Taylor explains, "For I do not just feel desire to help this man. 
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client quickly demonstrates to students that a rhetorical exchange can be 
extremely demanding because it is so decentering. Rhetorical engagement 
demands an intersubjective relationship if it is to be successful in a close 
case; crude manipulative tricks simply don’t work.78 
 
We lawyers have tools to engage in normative argument that structure the 
process of giving reasons for the demands of justice. We cannot do our jobs 
without  them.  Some  of  them  track  arguments  from  other  fields,  such  as 
moral theory, economics, political philosophy, and literature. Some of them 
are more specific to law; traditional methods of doctrinal analysis embody 
both general principles and intuitions, rules and cases, broad concepts and 
specific applications, rules and counter-rules, claims and defenses. Lawyering 
methods connected with the elaboration of legal doctrine aid clear thinking 
about the meaning of rule choices and the precise contours of fundamental 
moral and political values. Lawyers use general norms, such as fairness and 
efficiency, but we also look to patterns, exemplary cases, and general rules to 
help us think through the justifiability of alternative resolutions of a case.  
It  turns  out  that  lawyers  have  something  important  to  teach  moral 
philosophers, economists, and political theorists. We are the authors of our 
claims but we are also their subjects;
79 justice and deconstruction can coexist 
if we recognize that normative argument need not be airtight or definitive to 
make it valuable. The fact that we choose how to live together does not mean 
that we cannot choose wisely or defend our proposed terms of cooperation in 
ways that others could be expected to accept. One might call this approach 
critical normativity.
80 Justice is a human achievement, not a found object. It 
requires humility in a world of disagreement about conceptions of the good. 
But the likely continuation of fundamental disagreement does not obviate the 
need to make considered judgments and to give reasons we can defend to 
justify our social and legal arrangements. The Talmud teaches, “it is not up to 
us to finish the task, but neither may we desist from it.”
81 If T.H. White is 
right that “there is something important in humanity,”
82 then we must attend 
                                                 
78 MOOTZ, supra note 22, at 132-133.  
79 See Anderson, Pragmatism, science, and moral inquiry, supra note 36, at 23 ("The subject 
matter  of  humanistic  and  social  scientific  inquiry  is  ourselves.  This  fact  has  inescapable 
practical  implications.  As  Charles  Taylor  has  emphasized,  it  is  part  of  our  nature  as  self-
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80  See  RICHARDSON,  supra  note  5,  at  305  (explaining  his  "theory  of  critically  relative 
rationality"). 
81 MISHNAH PIRKEI AVOT (ETHICS OF THE FATHERS) 1:18 (BABYLONIAN TALMUD). 
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to the human impulse to treat each person with equal concern and respect 
and  this  fundamentally  requires  us  to  figure  out  how  to  give  legitimate 
reasons for the laws that structure our lives. 
 
§ 3.0 LAW AS APPLIED MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 
 
§ 3.1 What lawyers can learn from moral and political theory 
 
There is a tendency these days for legal scholars to believe that lawyers have 
no  specialized  knowledge.  Legal  reasoning  is  thought  to  be  empty  unless 
filled  with  some  external  theory  like  economics,  moral  theory,  political 
philosophy, or history. We no longer have faith in “legal reasoning” or in 
custom, tradition, or precedent as ways to resolve legal issues. We look to 
other fields to fill in the gaps of ours. We look to economic theory or moral 
theory or political philosophy to provide a structure to normative argument 
in law. If law involves conflicting arguments, competing norms, divergent 
and contradictory worldviews, we have no choice but to go outside law to 
find  a  firm  foundation  for  rational  choice,  just  adjudication,  or  wise 
governing. 
There are two fundamental flaws with this view. First, it turns out that 
those fields similarly look outside themselves to answer the questions they 
cannot answer. Economists for example, assume that the legal system assigns 
property rights – an institutional fact that is necessary before markets can 
even get off the ground. Thus, they look to lawyers to answer questions that 
provide  the  basis  or  foundation  for  their  own  arguments,  concepts,  and 
procedures. So lawyers cannot simply use economic analysis if that analysis 
needs  lawyers  to  define  the  baselines  from  which  the  economic  analysis 
should begin. Perhaps we could turn to political and moral theory to give us 
the baseline needed by the economists. 
That brings us to the second flaw in the view that social theory can guide 
lawyers. Political and moral theory tends to operate at a relatively high level 
of abstraction. Political theorists consider the basic structure of society and 
moral theorists consider the kinds of reasons appropriate to interpersonal 
relations. Lawyers, on the other hand, spend more of our time in the world of 
what is often thought of as applied moral theory. We hammer out the details 
of concrete social interactions in the context of specific problems. The moral 
and  political  theorists  seem  to  assume  either  that  their  analyses  can  be 
applied in a straightforward manner to concrete cases or that the details of 
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legal  rules  are  technical  matters  unrelated  to  fundamental  normative 
dilemmas.  But  we  lawyers  know  better.  The normative  controversies dealt 
with by these theorists at the level of high principle go all the way down; they 
recur at the application stage – they never go away. 
That being said, I do believe, that lawyers do have a great deal to learn 
from economists, moral theorists, and political philosophers. Among other 
things, economists teach us (1) to look at the consequences of adopting one 
rule of law over another; (2) to consider the incentives that alternative rules 
create for behavior; and (3) to compare the costs and benefits of alternative 
courses of action, and (4) to think systematically about the interplay of forces 
in social and economic life, the remote and interconnected effects of different 
rules and institutions, and the ways in which particular changes effect remote 
and  unexpected  changes  elsewhere.  Today  law  professors  and  judges 
generally  recognize  these  benefits  of  economic  theory  in  choosing  and 
justifying legal rules. What they do not sufficiently appreciate are the benefits 
of using the insights of moral and political theory to address the issues that 
economists set aside.  
Moral  and  political  theorists  have  valuable  lessons  for  lawyers.  Moral 
theorists, for example, teach us (1) the importance of giving legitimate and 
relevant reasons to others to justify our actions when we affect them; (2) the 
foundational idea that individual persons are of intrinsic and immeasurable 
importance, that they are imbued with dignity, and entitled to equal concern 
and respect; (3) that this means that we judge preferences rather than merely 
deferring to them; and (4) that we cannot legitimately claim to support a 
particular rule governing individual conduct if we cannot consistently support 
that principle in similar situations in the future to similarly situated persons 
(including ourselves). Political theorists teach us (1) that we should attempt 
to give reasons for laws and governing structures that could, would, or should 
be acceptable to everyone regardless of their own particular views of the good; 
(2) that we cannot identify such reasons without making assumptions about 
human nature and relationships and foundational norms such as autonomy, 
dignity, security, and equality; and (3) that the persistence of dispute and 
debate  about  political  and  legal  questions  does  not  relieve  us  of  the 
responsibility to specify what these fundamental values mean in a free and 
democratic society that tries to treat  each person  with equal  concern and 
respect. 
Here is another way to put this: Economic analysis works from a given 
baseline  – usually the status quo  – and then asks whether change in that 
baseline  improves  things  overall.  Moral  and  political  theorists  focus  on 
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they seek to understand the basic framework of a free and democratic society 
within which cost-benefit analysis can proceed. They also develop ways to 
talk about values that cannot be reduced to dollar amounts or which cannot 
be  sufficiently  respected  by  attempts  to  maximize  them.  These  theorists 
therefore work on the questions that preoccupy lawyers: what are the basic 
entitlements that individuals should have before they begin bargaining with 
each other or interacting in the market or social life? What are the minimum 
standards for contractual relationships within a free and democratic society 
that accords each person equal concern and respect? Not only the questions 
but  the  methods  of  reasoning  used  by  moral  and  political  theorists  are 
congenial to the work that lawyers and judges engage in. For this reason, 
moral and political theory provide enormously useful resources for lawyers 
that cannot be replicated by reducing all rule choices to economic terms. 
 
§ 3.2 What lawyers can teach moral and political theorists 
 
§ 3.2.1 Law is complex 
 
I  have  argued  that  lawyers  have  much  to  learn  from  moral  and  political 
theorists, but  I also believe that the oppposite is true as well. Lawyers do 
possess specialized knowledge that is of immense value to economic, moral, 
and political theory. What do lawyers know? For one thing, many moral and 
political theorists appear to underestimate how hard it is to define the legal 
structures  associated  with  market  and  social  relations  in  a  free  and 
democratic  society.
83  Nonlawyers  (and  a  few  lawyers)  sometimes  imagine 
                                                 
83 I do not mean to argue that all moral and political theorists misunderstand the complexity of 
moral choices and legal structures supporting a free and democratic society. Indeed, a number 
of important  theorists have  articulated  and defended the idea  that  values are complicated, 
contextually  contingent,  plural  in  nature,  and  conflicting  in  application,  and  that  the  only 
reasonable way to handle such complexity is through a form of practical reason rather than a 
tight  deductive  or  logical  system  of  concepts.  This  article  builds  on  their  work.  Examples 
include ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3; FOGELIN, supra note 1; 
RICHARDSON,  supra  note  5;  TAYLOR,  SOURCES  OF  THE  SELF,  supra  note  7;  Anderson, 
Pragmatism, science, and moral inquiry, supra note 36; TIMMONS, MORAL THEORY, supra note 
20;  MARGARET  URBAN  WALKER,  MORAL  UNDERSTANDINGS  (1998);  Margaret  Urban  Walker, 
Moral Understandings: Alternative "Epistemology" for a Feminist Ethics, 4 HYPATIA 15 (1989). 
My point is not that no philosophers have recognized the complexity of moral life but that, 
because lawyers are charged with constructing rules and principles to guide numerous real 
world situations, we have rich experience in applied moral and political theory that tends to 
cause us to accept the idea that complexity is inevitable and that abstract theories are unlikely 
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that only a few basic normative choices need to be made (such as deciding to 
have and to protect private property, to enforce promises, to prevent both 
intentional harms and negligent conduct, and to support the institution of 
marriage) and that once those choices are made, application of those norms 
to  particular  conduct  follows  naturally,  logically,  inexorably,  and  even 
mechanically. Nonlawyers generally think that the law could and should be 
relatively clear and simple; lawyers are unpopular partly because nonlawyers 
believe  that  we  know  how  to  twist  things  to  make  a  simple  problem 
complicated.
84  
Lawyers  know,  on  the  other  hand,  that  defining  the  rules  governing 
social  interaction  and  market  relationships  is  a  very,  very  complicated 
business.
85 Lawyers are acutely aware that we cannot identify a small number 
of clear principles and apply them in a straightforward manner to particular 
cases. Although this was arguably the aim during the era of classical legal 
thought  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  it  is  now  fairly  well 
understood that that effort was a colossal failure.
86 Seemingly simple concepts 
like "property" or the "free market" cannot be defined in a few sentences. As 
the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, Jiri Dienstbier, commented in 1990, 
“[i]t was easier to make a revolution than to write 600 to 800 laws to create a 
market economy.”
87 If anything, he understated the case. 
Lawyers are expert at one aspect of analytical philosophy; we know how 
to ferret out ambiguities in fundamental concepts and principles. To clarify 
those ambiguities, we divide legal issues into many constituent parts. Rather 
than merely asking whether the defendant wronged the plaintiff, we divide 
the  question  into  a  number  of  elements,  such  as  duty,  breach,  causation, 
damage.  Then  in  defining  each  of  these  elements  we  further  distinguish 
among  kinds  of  duty,  breach,  causation,  and  damage.  For  example,  we 
identify  different  duties  leading  to  various  torts,  such  as  fraud,  assault, 
battery, libel, negligence, infliction of emotional distress. And then we further 
define what those torts mean; so the duties imposed by the tort of fraud are 
themselves  defined  by  a  number  of  distinct  elements,  such  as  (a)  a 
representation (b) that was false when made, (c) intended to induce reliance 
by the plaintiff, (d) which did in fact induce reliance (e) where the reliance 
was reasonable, and (f) caused the plaintiff harm. We then see difficulties in 
                                                 
84 Even a few scholars are  taken in by such impossible dreams of simplicity.  See RICHARD 
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). 
85 See RICHARDSON, supra note 5, at xi ("discerning the true complexity of value"). 
86 KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 50.. 
87 William Echikson, Euphoria Dies Down in Czechoslovakia, Wall St. J. (Sept. 18, 1990), at 
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determining the meaning of each of these elements of the claim. Then we add 
defenses, which have their own difficulties of interpretation and application. 
We  refine  the  meaning  of  these  analytical  elements  by  reference  to  other 
concepts, social contexts, underlying norms, narratives, and social policies. 
We make finer and finer distinctions until the rule books are thousands of 
pages long.  
We lawyers do all this not because we are perverse and not because we 
get secret thrills in making simple things complicated. Nor do we do it so that 
we can turn ourselves into an expert guild where we are the only ones able to 
interpret this morass and are therefore able to earn a living. We make law 
complicated because qualitative distinctions matter and they matter at this 
level of detail. The process of applying rules and doctrines to particular cases 
reveals the normative complexity involved in determining the meaning of 
moral principles and public policies. As lawyers, we are confronted with, and 
highly attuned to, the number and the complexity of choices that must be 
made to put abstract concepts and ideals into practice in the real world. 
The  field  of  ethics  tends  to  distinguish  general  ethical  theory  (meta-
ethics) from applied ethics. Those who do applied ethics are often looked on 
as  technicians.  The  real  work  is  done  at  the  level  of  principle  while  the 
application work is done by the hired hands. The division of labor seems akin 
to those between architect and builder or physicist and engineer or manager 
and secretary. Lawyers know better. The process of applying law to concrete 
cases  heightens  our  awareness  of  the  complexity  of  our  values  and  the 
difficulty  of  determining  their  scope  and  weight  in  particular  cases.  Our 
society is one characterized by many disagreements about moral values. Even 
when we agree on fundamental values, we find that they are multiple and 
conflicting;  they  push  us  different  ways  when  we  try  to  apply  them  to 
concrete  cases;  we  want  efficiency  and  equality,  freedom  of  action  and 
security,  stability  and  change,  majority  rule  and  constitutional  rights, 
freedom  of  religion  and  freedom  from  the  establishment  of  religion.  We 
cannot make grand choices between private property and communism and 
then assume that these choices come with a built-in institutional structure. 
We choose to have private property – and then what? Then we wind up with 
the  twenty-volume  treatise  on  my  shelves  explaining  the  complexities  of 
defining what that means – a treatise that itself is a summary of thousands of 
cases attempting to define the contours of the property system. 
Drawing appropriate lines between competing values is complicated, and 
because the rules in force attempt to protect and vindicate conflicting values, 
the rules in force reflect careful calibration and sophisticated line drawing. 
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reconcile  all  these  competing  normative  considerations.  Sometimes  the 
theorists  even  convince  themselves  that  they  have  succeeded  in  that  task. 
However,  most  lawyers  (and  judges)  know  better.  When  we  apply  these 
metatheories  to  concrete  cases,  we  find  ourselves  dissatisfied.  We  are  not 
persuaded that rights should always be sacrified on the altar of efficiency; nor 
are  we  persuaded  that  abstractly  and  formalistically  defined  rights  be 
protected though the heavens fall.
88 Moreover, the application process shows 
us the utility of looking at the same moral dilemma from multiple points of 
view. We like using several approaches; we find them useful, illuminating, 
attractive, and helpful. 
Law is complicated not only because our values are complicated, and not 
only  because  the  application  process  reveals  the  limitations  of  simplistic 
metatheories, but because our values legitimately and understandably evolve 
over  time.  Lawyers  know  that  we  need  to  accommodate  rules  to  existing 
social values and conditions. We cannot continue to apply rules that may 
have  worked  well  in  1792  in  2008  if  those  rules  cannot  be  defended  as 
consistent  with  current  values  and  circumstances.  Arguments  for 
interpreting  law in  light of “original intent” of the  founders  are  generally 
limited to constitutional claims and instances of statutory interpretation. And 
even then room must be made for evoluation of meaning; after all, many of 
the Founding Fathers owned slaves. Although adherence to precedent and 
deference  to  the  legislature  to  overturn  precedent  are  widely  accepted 
arguments  when  state  courts  interpret  common  law,  it  is  not  commonly 
thought that the law should develop by reference to conditions or values that 
existed 200 years ago. Indeed, if anything, deference to policies enacted in 
currently enforceable legislation is a stronger source of interpretive guidance 
than the common law as it existed a long time ago. Moreover, no one can 
dispute that the common law has changed drastically since the beginning of 
the nation. Conduct that would not have been thought harmful to land in the 
past is now understood to cause harmful pollution which can be regulated by 
the common law of nuisance or environmental law. Exclusionary conduct 
that would  have been perfectly legal  in 1858 is now prohibited by public 
accommodation laws.  Current public policies  in favor of abolishing racial 
discrimination in the market place may affect interpretation of common law 
rules regarding control of property.
89  
                                                 
88 See FOGELIN, supra note 1, at — (explaining the fallacy of assuming that norms must be 
absolute); RICHARDSON, supra note 5, at 70–71 (discussing "logically nonabsolute norms"); id. 
at 77–79 (explaining the importance of specification). 
89 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 
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In short, the impetus to refine legal rules by making numerous analytical 
distinctions and by multiplying the number and complexity of rules is not a 
smokescreen  designed  to  protect  a  monopolistic  guild.  Rather,  it  is  a 
consequence of lawyers' intimate knowledge of the normative complexities 
involved in making real our most treasured values. Most fundamentally, it 
results from our commitment to treat human beings with equal concern and 
respect – a commitment that does not allow us apply a formula mechanically 
without  careful  and  considered  regard  for  its  impact  on  individuals  in 
particular cases. It results from our commitment to the idea that like cases be 
treated alike and our awareness from careful studying of prior attempts to 
accomplish  this  goal  that  determining  when  one  case  is  like  another  is  a 
process that requires practical reason, moral judgment, and fine distinctions. 
The complexity of law expresses our commitment to our most basic values, as 
we see that particular cases cause us to revise those values or delimit their 
scope when they conflict with other values, thereby necessitating distinctions, 
multi-layered  doctrines,  and  calibration  of  rules  to  appropriate  situations. 
This raises the importance of context in applying norms to cases, and it is to 
that issue we now turn. 
 
§ 3.2.2 Context matters 
 
A second insight lawyers can teach philosophers is our acute awareness of the 
importance of context in determining both the scope and content of legal 
rules.
90 For example, consider the idea that ownership of land includes the 
right to exclude nonowners from the property. The right to exclude seems a 
natural implication of the idea of ownership if ownership is understood to 
mean exclusive control of valuable objects in the world. Ownership rights, so 
understood, protect core values of autonomy, privacy, and security, as well as 
promoting the general welfare.  But does the  "right to exclude" mean that 
restaurants are entitled to exclude customers because of their race? Does it 
mean that employers are entitled to exclude the city health inspector? Does 
the right to exclude mean that a citizen of New Orleans was trespassing if she 
sought  to  save  her  life  by  entering  a  neighbor’s  house  during  Hurricane 
Katrina?  Are  landlords  entitled  to  prevent  tenants  from  having  overnight 
guests? Can homeowners near airports prevent planes from flying too low 
over their properties? Lawyers are experts in thinking up questions like this; 
we  do  it  because  we  study  cases  in  which  existing  rules  seem  to  have 
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unfortunate  consequences  and  mechanical  application  of  a  seemingly 
applicable rule will seem harsh, unfair, or socially destructive. We are experts 
in finding the limits of principles by examining the cases to which they apply. 
Lawyers know that all you have to do is change one fact and suddenly our 
intuitions  about  the  right  result  in  the  situation  can  change  dramatically. 
Tenants have a duty to pay rent, but suppose the landlord fails to repair a 
broken furnace and thus fails to provide heat and hot water to the tenant’s 
apartment as required by both the housing code and the terms of the lease 
agreement; does the duty to pay rent persist? Towns have the power to pass 
zoning laws segregating incompatible uses such as industry and housing, but 
suppose a town passes a law segregating homeowners by race? Employers 
cannot  refuse  to  hire  someone  because  of  their  sex,  but  can  they  refuse 
because  of  their  sexual  orientation?  (Although  federal  law  prohibits  sex 
discrimination,  most  states  allow  discrimination  based  on  sexual 
orientation.) The statute of frauds requires transfers of land to be in writing 
to be enforceable, but if the grantor fails to sign a deed in 1850, and this is 
discovered in 2008, does that mean title should immediately revert to the 
heirs  of  the  original  grantor,  and  if  they  cannot  be  found,  that  it  should 
thereby escheat to the state? A joint tenant succeeds to the interest of her co-
owner when the co-owner dies but what if he murdered her? 
The law makes distinctions based on the context in which the rules are to 
be applied. And because context matters, rules do not determine the scope of 
their own application.
91 Lawyers are more experienced than nonlawyers with 
the  practice  of  studying  the  detailed  and  varying  contexts  in  which  law 
applies, we are acutely aware that competing values (such as ending racial 
discrimination  in  market  transactions  or  saving  human  life  or  creating 
stability  in  property  rights)  may  cause  lawmakers  to  create  exceptions  to 
basic rules or to narrow the scope of those rules to factual settings where they 
are  appropriate.  Moreover,  changes  in  facts,  social  context,  environment, 
other  laws,  and  relationships  among  the  parties,  all  may  be  involved  in 
limiting the application of a rule. Karl Llewellyn was correct when he argued 
that a case has almost no meaning by itself.
92 We cannot tell whether the rule 
in the case is broad or narrow without viewing it in relation to rules that 
came before and cases that come afterwards.  
Lawyers are trained in the art of distinguishing cases, and it is, indeed, an 
                                                 
91 See TOULMIN, supra note 20, at 27 ("The general concepts in which we articulate our ideas 
and beliefs have formal implications, and it is the task of theoretical analysis to sort out and 
elucidate them. But, by itself, such a theoretical analysis does not tell us in what situations—
how, where, or when—everyday life and practice exemplify those ideas." 
92 LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 24, at 48. Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  45 
art. It cannot be done mechanically; nor can it be done arbitrarily. Only some 
distinctions make sense and will be persuasive to a conscientious decision 
maker.
93 This is another reason why law is complicated; it cannot be reduced 
to a complete system of formal rules without distortion or sacrifice of core 
values. Lawyer are not only attentive to appropriate contexts for application 
of basic norms, but understand that defining those contexts is an activity that 
cannot be performed mechanically or deductively. Rather, it grows out of our 
considered  judgments  about  the  right  result  in  particular  cases  and  an 
attempt to justify those results by reference to underlying principles. This 
form of reasoning  may seem irrational to those  who identify reason with 
logical, mechanical, or deductive forms of analysis. But these are not the only 
analytical methods available to us, as I explain in the next sections.  
 
§ 3.2.3 Narrative matters  
 
Lawyers  are  better  aware  than  most  (but  not  all  philosophers)
94  that  we 
understand  both  social  context  and  social  values  partly  by  narrative 
techniques. In deciding how to handle any particular case, lawyers begin by 
telling the story. Every judicial opinion starts with a recitation of the facts – 
essentially a narrative. Lawyers are trained to describe the relevants facts in a 
manner that unites the facts and the law so as to highlight which facts matter, 
what social roles the parties are occupying, the nature of their relationships, 
and the history of the dispute. How one tells the story may affect how one 
understands the relative importance of competing considerations, facts and 
values, as well as the morality, justice, fairness, and ultimate justifiability of 
alternative  courses of action. Lawyers understand that the construction of 
narrative is part of the way we reason morally. Narrative is part of the way we 
understand and judge relationships, actions, causes and effects; it is a large 
part of the way we assign responsibility.
95 
                                                 
93  See  ANDERSON,  VALUE  IN  ETHICS  AND  ECONOMICS,  supra  note  3,  at  30  ("No  adequate 
interpretation  of  a  way  of  valuing  something  can  reduce  its  motivational  component  to  a 
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94  See  TOULMIN,  supra  note  20,  at  123  ("In  place  of  abstract  universal  concepts,  practical 
disciplines  focus  on  particular  episodes.  Convincing  narratives  have  a  kind  of  weight  that 
mathematical formulas do not."). 
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If this is true – that telling the story is a part of how we reason morally – 
then  it  cannot  be  true  that  we  could  apply  the  law  simply  by  identifying 
principles, deducing specific rules, and applying those rules in a manner that 
is  relatively  mechanical.  There  is  no  decision  procedure  for  creating  an 
appropriate narrative. 
Consider the infamous Kelo decision, in which the Supreme Court found 
no constitutional bar to a city's taking property in a proposed development 
area by eminent domain and transfering parcels to private developers who 
would remake the neighborhood so as to create jobs, increase the value of the 
land (and hence property taxes needed to pay for schools, fire, and police 
protection),  and  promote  economic  development  in  a  depressed 
municipality.
96 Critics attacked the decision by arguing that it made every 
person's  property  vulnerable  to  being  taken  at  any  time.  They  argued 
(wrongly but fiercely) that this decision would allow any city to take anyone's 
house and transfer it to someone else who the city thought would use the 
property  better.  More  importantly, the  critics emphasized that this power 
would be (and was) used to displace lower income families and replace them 
with either richer families or big businesses. It even would allow (and had in 
the past allowed) urban renewal, whose effect if not purpose was to displace 
African Americans and replace them with white people. 
The defenders of the decision had a very different narrative. They told a 
story about a depressed municality suffering from  economic stagnation, a 
declining job base, decreasing property values with resulting reductions in 
property taxes, leading to inadequate funding for public services which in 
turn led to poor public schools and the flight of the middle class. Each of 
these conditions fed the others leading to a downward spiral that was hard to 
stop. Because property taxes pay for most city services, the municality had 
few options to improve the situation. The state had the power to help but it 
was indifferent to the suffering occurring in less wealthy communities like 
New London. The story was one of a powerful but indifferent state and a 
relatively  powerless  municipality.  To  respond  to  the  indifference  of  state 
authorities, the city had no choice but to use the one power it had  – the 
power to shape land use to revitalize the local community by bringing in new 
business,  new  jobs  and  thereby  increasing  property  values  and  taxes  to 
improve the increasingly inadequate public services. Redevelopment of the 
city would revitalize the economy, create jobs and improve public services. 
                                                                                                                
effective criteria for settling real-life disputes in actual cases."); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's 
Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937 (1990) (explaining the centrality 
of narrative to legal reasoning). 
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Adequate compensation of the displaced owners would enable them to buy 
comparable  replacement  housing  in  the  city,  perhaps  even  in  the  same 
neighborhood.  Displacement  of  owners  who  did  not  want  to  move  was 
indeed a bad thing but the city's options were limited. By refusing to sell her 
land or allow it to be taken by eminent domain, Suzette Kelo was vetoing the 
only plan likely to alleviate the suffering of others in the city. Limiting the 
city’s  eminent  domain  power  would  condemn  everyone  in  the  city  to 
deteriorating conditions, limited prospects, and stifled opportunities.  
Competing narratives are one of the main ways lawyers debate the nature 
of the problem that has to be solved. It is also a major technique for clarifying 
the norms underlying social relationships and the contours of institutions. 
Determining the appropriate story is one of the ways we come to understand 
the  meaning  of  the  dispute,  as  well  as  the  appropriateness  of  applying 
particular rules to particular social contexts.
97 
 
§ 3.2.4 Practical reason can handle incommensurable values 
 
Lawyers  recognize  that  we  have  plural,  incommensurable  values  and  we 
generally  hold  to  a  form  of  practical  reason  to  decide  hard  cases  in  a 
pragmatic manner. The stance most of us take toward normative argument 
rests on several observations. First, we are aware that we have multiple values 
and  that  these  values  often  conflict  with  each  other.
98  Second,  after  long 
experience  in  applying  norms  of  fairness  and  welfare  to  human  conflicts, 
most  of  us  find  it  entirely  unlikely  that  anyone  will  ever  construct  a 
metatheory that reduces all human values to a single metric or master value, 
such  as  autonomy,  pleasure,  or  happiness.  Practicing  lawyers  are  acutely 
aware that we cannot, without distortion, flatten all distinctions of worth or 
quality by representing  all normative considerations  as instantiations of a 
single supreme value.
99 And it is an even greater distortion of our values to 
try to quantify everything of value. Third, for the most part, lawyers are not 
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attracted by the fantasy that we can use abstractions to dissolve complexity.
100 
Norms  such  as  liberty  are  too  abstract  to  decide  hard  cases.  Finally,  we 
consider  it  unlikely  that  anyone  will  ever  identify  rigid  priority  rules  to 
adjudicate among plural values. We have seen too many cases where a change 
in the situation in which a rule is operating causes us to distinguish the case 
and create an exception to the presumptively applicable rule. At the same 
time,  despite  our  recognition  of  the  complexity  of  our  moral  lives,  most 
lawyers stand with those philosophers who argue that it is possible to make 
considered, reasoned judgments in the face of plural values. We hold to a 
form of practical reason or rough-and-tumble pragmatism.  
To think clearly about the normative implications  of rule choices, we 
make qualitative distinctions among different kinds of human interests.
101 To 
do  this,  we  must  characterize  the  interests  at  stake  in  social  disputes.
102 
Consider the question of whether landlords should have a duty to mitigate 
damages when tenants breach lease agreements. Assume a law student living 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts signed a year long lease lasting from September 
1, 2007 to August 31, 2008. In January 2008, the student gets a job offer at a 
law firm in New York City. The lease prohibits subletting. The tenant asks 
the landlord for permission to sublet the apartment over the summer or the 
right to get out of the lease obligations. She wants to move to New York and 
wishes  not  to  pay  two  rents  during  the  summer  months  (the  rent  at  the 
Cambridge apartment and the rent at her new New York apartment). The 
landlord refuses, the student takes the job in New York and stops paying rent 
on the Cambridge apartment, and the landlord waits until the end of the 
summer to sue the tenant for back rent, even though the landlord could have 
mitigated damages easily by allowing her to sublet the Cambridge apartment 
for the summer or by himself finding a replacement tenant for those months. 
Must she pay the summer rent for the Cambridge apartment to the landlord? 
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If the landlord has a duty to mitigate damages, then the answer is no; the 
landlord  could  have  avoided  the  damages  entirely  and  so  should  recover 
nothing. If the landlord has no  duty to mitigate damages, then the answer is 
yes. 
One way to address this question is by reference to efficiency concerns, 
using the notion of "efficient breach." This analysis assumes that the value of 
the lease can be reduced to economic terms and that the only question is one 
of price. The landlord bargained for a certain rent, paid monthly; the tenant 
promised to pay this rent in exchange for the right to live in the apartment 
for one year. If the landlord's only interest is in the economic value of the 
lease,  then  the  duty  to  mitigate  damages  (arguably)  protects  that  interest 
fully,  while  allowing  the  tenant  to  maximize  her  welfare  by  moving  and 
promoting the interests of the summer subletter who wanted access to the 
apartment for the summer. The result is Pareto optimal; the landlord is made 
whole (economically) while everyone else is better off as well (including the 
tenant, the subtenant, the new employer, and the new landlord in New York). 
Not  so  fast:  the  economic  argument  could  be  turned  around.  The 
landlord bargained for the right to monthly rent payments from this tenant 
for a year. The contract is an annuity; a right to receive a particular income 
from a particular person for a particular period of time. The landlord may 
have interests in getting the money from this particular tenant, not others to 
whom the tenant might transfer her obligations or others that the landlord 
could find to replace her. Why might the landlord be interested in locking in 
this tenant to the contract? First, the landlord may not want the hassle of 
looking for a new tenant twice a year (in September when new students move 
to town and in June when those students leave and others move into town for 
the summer). Second, the landlord may believe he has found a creditworthy 
tenant and wants to take advantage of her ability to pay rather than facing the 
vulnerability of dealing with a third party whose credit or track record is not 
so clear. If we characterize the landlord's interest in this way, we may say that 
the landlord has a property right in the tenant's promise. The landlord owns 
the right to get a monthly payment from this tenant – an obligation the tenant 
voluntarily accepted in a freely-negotiated agreement by signing a lease that 
contained a "no subletting" clause and which had a one-year term. The tenant 
is not free to move without the consent of the landlord unless she is able to 
pay double rents for the summer months. 
But this raises a crucial question. Is the landlord's interest in getting the 
money  from  this  particular  tenant  a  legitimate  one?  One  view  is  that  the 
interest is legitimate if the landlord has it; on an anti-paternalist theory, we 
should  defer  to  the  landlord's  preferences,  whatever  they  are.  But  a Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  50 
competing theory would describe the landlord's preference differently, and 
do so in a manner that implies a moral judgment. Assume that most tenants 
cannot afford to pay double rents and that the landlord knows this; if that is 
the case, the landlord is seeking to control the tenant's behavior by coercing 
the tenant to stay in Cambridge over the summer and turn down the job in 
New York. Another way to put this is that the landlord is seeking to tie the 
tenant to the land. If we characterize the landlord's interest in this way, it 
appears illegitimate; the landlord is seeking to act like a feudal lord, asserting 
too much power over his "tenant" and treating her like a vassal rather than a 
person entitled to control her own life – control that requires mobility rights 
and the freedom to change jobs. 
This example shows several things. First, normative considerations enter 
into our conceptualization of the interests at stake in legal disputes. We may 
characterize those interests in different  ways.  Second, it is not possible to 
reduce all values to equivalent units without distortion of those normative 
concerns.  Lawyers  understand  that  we  have  plural  values  and  that  it  is  a 
distortion of those values to characterize them as embodying a single value 
like  utility,  happiness,  or  even  "respect."  Third,  we  can  and  do  make 
judgments about the legitimacy of individual interests. Another way to say 
this is that we judge preferences and determine some of them to be out of 
bounds.  How  then  do  we  compare  competing  values  if  they  are 
incommensurable  in  the  sense  that  they  cannot,  without  distortion,  be 
reduced to a common metric?  
Many philosophers seek theories that dissolve incommensurabilities by 
appealing  to  higher  order  norms  or  metatheories  that  provide  rational 
priorities among competing values. Lawyers and judges and law makers, on 
the other hand, are rarely beguiled by monistic theories. We make utilitarian 
arguments; we talk about rights, justice, fairness; we are concerned to define 
the appropriate institutional role for judges in a free and democratic society; 
we  tell  the  story;  we  resort  to  process  to  solve  substantive  problems. 
Moreover,  we  are  skeptical  about  the  ability  of  rigid  priority  rules  to 
determine  just  outcomes  in  specific  cases.  In  short,  we  use  multiple 
normative strategies, unashamed that we are unable to find killer arguments 
that put all normative controversies to bed or that we are borrowing from 
warring traditions.  
Lawyers  are  realistic;  we  do  not  expect  debate  to  end  or  normative 
argument to be resolved. We know that it is possible to compare values in the 
context of particular cases, to consider thoughtfully the appropriate "balance" 
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applying  a  formulaic  or  algorithmic  decision  procedure.
103  We  are 
comfortable with an “all-things-considered” approach and do not conclude 
that this makes decisions irrational or indefensible. We accept this muddled 
situation because we must. The case must be decided; endless debate is not 
possible. But we also accept it because we need all the tools at our disposal to 
help us accomplish this task of deciding and giving reasons for the decision. 
Lawyers and judges do not have the luxury of ideological purity; the inability 
of philosophers to come to agreement after thousands of years of normative 
argument means that lawyers cannot simply pick one normative approach 
over others and fail to listen to other types of arguments. We use what we 
have.
104 
Legal judgments are essentially based on practical reason.
105 As in other 
uses of practical reason, the process of coming to a conclusion about the right 
thing  to  do  requires  judgment;  conclusions  are  not  derived  mechanically 
from a logical decision procedure. Multiple factors are  taken into account. 
No  theory  that  purports  to  choose  applicable  principles  by  deductive 
reasoning  or  application  of  a  mechanical  decision  procedure  will  ever  be 
adequate for helping judges adjudicate disputes or do their job of making, 
interpreting,  and  enforcing  law.  We  can  reason  about  values,  and  give 
reasons  for  our decisions,  even though  we  do not  have  metatheories that 
reconcile all conflicting values under a common decision procedure or metric 
or that fit them to preconceived rigid priority rules. Indeed, lawyers know 
that judgment based on multiple factors and various suitably impartial but 
non-mechanical  decision  procedures  is  the  only  rational  way  to  make 
decisions in the face of multiple values.
106 
 
§ 3.2.5 Justification constrains judgment: the art of talking to the loser 
 
Lawyers  are  aware  that  the  process  of  justifying  decisions  publicly  can 
constrain  choice  even  if  our  reasoning  processes  require  the  exercise  of 
considered  judgment  rather  than  application  of  an  algorithmic  decision 
procedure.  Judicial  opinions  therefore  play  a  crucial  role  both  in  helping 
judges think through the normative issues at stake in particular cases and in 
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limiting judicial discretion. Cases arise not only when lawyers seek to enforce 
their clients' rights under existing law, but when lawyers call the attention of 
judges  to  gaps,  conflicts,  and  ambiguities  in  the  law.  In  justifying  one 
interpretation of the law over another, the judges must both acknowledge the 
ambiguity that gave rise to the need for a judicial decision and explain its 
resolution in a manner that attempts to show how the decision is consistent 
with existing rules (precedent) and promotes justice. This may, of course, 
require  the  existing  rules  to  be  reinterpreted  or  changed  if  justice  so 
demands. The end goal of this process is to explain to relevant audiences the 
reasons that justify the resolution chosen by the judge. From the standopoint 
of normative support, the main audience for the decision is the losing party. 
If the moral impulse is based on the felt need to give reasons that others can 
accept,  then  the  core  function  of  the  justificatory  judicial  opinion  is  to 
explain to the loser why the law favors the interests of the other party over 
her  own. The obligation to  give such reasons has significant constraining 
effects on the decision itself. 
Judges both defer to existing rules and shape them. In general, we want 
judges to enforce laws passed by the legislature and, when enforcing common 
law rules, to treat like cases alike while showing equal concern and respect for 
all persons. But judges have power to decide the cases before them; what, 
short of impeachment, constrains their exercise of power? The usual answer 
is that we want judges to follow the rule of law; they should apply the law 
rather  than  make  it.  But  lawyers  know  that  this  answer  is  woefully 
inadequate. Ambiguous statutes require interpretation. Constitutional rights 
render some statutory provisions void. Common law evolves with changing 
social values and conditions, and the process of applying the rules in force 
involves  human  judgment.  Considered  by  itself,  we  cannot  know  what  a 
precedent means. It must be situated in context, and given its appropriate 
scope, meaning, and force by reference to considerations of utility, rights, 
social policy, or other normative considerations. Judges must determine the 
scope of existing rules by deciding when and how to distinguish cases, create 
exceptions, or apply competing rules or principles.  
Although rules do have significant constraining power on judges, they 
are well versed in how to escape the clutches of those rules. For that reason, I 
believe the greatest constraining force on judges is not the abstract injunction 
to follow the law. The biggest check on the arbitrary or oppressive use of 
judicial power is the duty to give public reasons for their decisions, justifying 
their choices by writing judicial opinions.
107 The giving of reasons does have 
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a significant constraining effect on what judges do.  
Lawyers are also acutely aware that judicial judgments do not take place 
arbitrarily or in an unconstrained manner. Numerous constraining factors 
limit the actions that judges feel appropriate in particular cases, including 
role considerations, conceptions of democracy and fundamental rights, the 
social and historical context in which disputes arise, as well as the numerous 
normative  arguments  that  influence  how  judges  rule  in  particular  cases. 
Judges  have  the  peculiar  experience  of  being  responsible  for  making 
important  choices  in  a  manner  that  is  not  mechanically  determined  by 
superior  authority  or  existing  principles  while  also  feeling  hemmed  in  by 
various constraining factors that very significantly limit their discretion.
108 
The ultimate truth about the judge’s lawmaking role is the need to exercise 
judgment, not on a blank playing field, but in a field of hedging forces. 
I have taught a seminar on the Supreme Court for about fifteen years. 
The students discuss cases being decided in the current term of the Supreme 
Court, read the briefs, and vote on what they would do if they were on the 
Supreme Court. After the initial discussion and vote, one student is assigned 
to write a proposed majority opinion. Every time I have taught this course, at 
least one student changes her mind about how to vote once she starts trying 
to write the opinion. It is sometimes the case that she finds that she cannot 
rule  the  way  she  wanted  without  overruling  too  many  cases,  and  her 
conception of the judical role makes this problematic. More common is the 
problem  of  answering  counterarguments.  I  insist  that  the  opinion  writer 
explain the strongest arguments on the other side and answer them. When 
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the student cannot come up with a good answer to a counterargument, she 
often reverses the outcome, trying out what it would be like to rule the other 
way, justify the result, recite the strongest counterarguments and then answer 
those counterarguments. My insistence on stating the other side’s arguments 
and responding to them sometimes forces the student to switch sides. And 
often this happens more than once. I have had years when six of the twelve 
students reversed themselves after trying – and failing – to write the opinion 
the way they initially voted. 
It is the giving of reasons that could be plausibly made to all affected 
parties that  may be the strongest discipline  on judicial decisions. Reasons 
must be given to lower court judges to explain what they are expected to do; 
reasons must be given to the general public, to the legal profession, to the 
press. But most important, respect for human dignity requires above all else 
that reasons be given to the losing side – reasons the judge believes the loser 
could  or  should  accept.  And  those  reasons  turn  out  to  be  based 
overwhelmingly on normative considerations. Sometimes the judge explains 
that the losing party's interests are illegitimate, at least in the context of the 
case at hand; at other times, the judge acknowledges the legitimacy of those 
interests  but  explains  why,  in  this  kind  of  case,  the  other  side's  interests 
should  prevail  over  the  losing  party's  interests.  This  kind  of  argument  is 
inevitably normatively charged. Lawyers and law students therefore need to 
know the available  frameworks and vocabulary for engaging in normative 
argument – especially normative argument about considerations of fairness, 
justice, morality, and the basic values of liberty and equality underlying the 
contours of a free and democratic society that treats each person with equal 
concern and respect. 
 
§ 4.0 NORMATIVE METHODS FOR LAWYERS 
 
What are the normative methods used by lawyers? I will identify the most 
commonly used normative methods used by lawyers and judges in choosing 
and  justifying  laws  on  the  basis  of  their  morality,  fairness,  justice,  or 
compatibility with the framework of a free and democratic society that treats 
each  person  with  equal  concern  and  respect.  There  are  four  stages  to 
normative  argument,  involving  somewhat  different  tasks:  (1)  orientation 
(adopting  basic  assumptions  about  human  nature,  society,  and  the  good; 
framing  the  question  presented;  telling  the  story);  (2)  evaluative  assertion 
(identifying  legitimate  human  interests,  needs,  and  wants  that  count  as 
human  values  or  moral  demands);  (3)  contextualization  (interpreting 
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situations to which the values appropriately attach); and (4) prioritization 
(resolving conflicts among values by suitably impartial decision procedures). 
My purpose here is not to give a full account of each of these methods, 
nor to consider the complexities in using each of them.  I hope merely to 
bring  to  consciousness  the  fact  that  we  have  such  methods,  what  their 
contours are, why they count as a form of practical reason (rather than being 
merely arbitrary) and some examples that show how they work. All these 
approaches should be familiar to any student who has attended law school. 
For  that  reason,  some  of  what  appears  here  may  seem  obvious  and  my 
invocation of these methods appear naïve. However, I have tried to show in 
the earlier part of this article why articulating these normative methods is 
important  and  needed.  The  prevailing  approaches  suggest  that  normative 
argument about fairness and justice is either pointless or obfuscatory. I seek 
to show that, on the contrary, normative methods are available, important, 
helpful, and, indeed, necessary to adjudicating cases fairly and wisely. While 
moral  arguments  can  be  used  to  justify  oppressive  interferences  with 
individual liberties, it is also true that the refusal to judge preferences and 
interests can also lead to oppression if satisfying those preferences enables 
some to exercize illegitimate power over others. Oppression is as  much a 
danger either way. Morality and justice-based arguments are therefore both 
unavoidable and necessary to shape the contours of the legal framework of a 
free and democratic society. We have various resources for thinking through 
and justifying rule choices based on their fairness, morality, and justice and 
bringing  these  methods  to  light  can  help  both  law  professors  and  law 
students recognize what these methods are and allow us to develop better 
ways of analyzing and justifying the values underlying the rule of law. 
 
§ 4.1 Orientation 
 
§ 4.1.1 Background understandings 
 
The  first  step  in  normative  argument  is  to  orient  ourselves  in  a  moral 
universe. Most of this orientation occurs unconsciously and is reflected in 
assumptions of which we may not even be aware. In debate about the right 
way to deal with a dispute, we often find competing orientations, including 
different  assumptions  about  human  nature,  the  good  society,  social 
relationships, the right way to think about justice, as well as the right way to 
view  the  facts.  Charles  Taylor  has  called  these  fundamental  assumptions Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  56 
“social imaginaries”
109 or “background pictures" that inform and frame our 
conceptions of social life and human relationships.
110 Importantly for law, 
background understanding shape our conceptions of the legal framework of a 
free and democratic society.
111 Taylor has also argued that it may sometimes 
can help to “articulate” our “background assumptions” so that  we  can be 
more  reflective  about  their  validity  or  defensibility.
112  Similarly,  Henry 
Richardson argues that "[w]hen people differ radically over what they take to 
be  axiomatic,  it  is  likely  that  they  also  arrived  at  these  beliefs  through 
strikingly different tacit exemplars."
113 He further explains: "Tacit exemplars 
resist rational deliberation because it is difficult to become fully aware  of 
them. Their influence in giving life to the terms we use and the views we hold 
is so pervasive that it is very difficult to bring them all to consciousness, let 
alone to obtain a critical perspective on them."
114 
Consider the well-known case of State v. Shack.
115 A doctor and a lawyer 
enter a farm to provide  government-funded  medical and  legal services to 
migrant farmworkers who were living and working there. The farm owner 
refuses to let them see the workers in the privacy of their barracks; instead, 
the  farmer  offers  to  have  the  meetings  conducted  in  his  offices  while  he 
watches and listens. The service providers refuse to agree to these conditions 
and the farmer orders them to leave his land. They refuse and are arrested for 
criminal trespass. They then move to dismiss the charges on the ground that 
they had a right to enter the land to provide government-funded services to 
the  farmworkers  who  wanted  to  receive  such  services.  How  should  the 
decision maker think about the case? 
The farmer would argue that the case can be resolved by asking a simple 
question: who owns the land? The farmer will argue that he does and that 
owners have the right to exclude non-owners; the defendants' refusal to leave 
after he asked them to do so violates his property rights. Nor did the farmer 
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waive  his  right  to  exclude  in  his  employment  contracts  with  his  workers 
when  he  hired  them;  he  did  not  give  the  workers  a  right  to  meet  with 
outsiders on the farmer's land. The farmer's perspective, as I have presented 
it, rests on a set of background assumptions about the nature of property and 
contract, as well as conceptions of individual rights and liberties and what it 
means to live in a free and democratic society. We might call this framework 
a libertarian social vision. 
The  libertarian  imaginary  rests  on  powerful  and  perhaps  even 
unconscious assumptions about the nature of both property rights and state 
power.  It  assumes,  for  example,  that  land  can  (and  should)  be  owned  by 
individuals; that each parcel of land has a single identifiable “owner“; that 
owners  have absolute powers to control their  land, including the right to 
exclude others; they they may exclude others for any reason, including a bad 
reason;  that  ownership  rights  protect  individual  interests  in  autonomy, 
privacy,  and  security  and  thus  cannot  be  limited  by  law  except  in 
extraordinary circumstances; that owners can waive the right to exclude by 
allowing  others  to  enter  their  property;  that  entry  can  be  conditioned  on 
terms chosen by the land owner; that business property is no different from 
residential  property;  and  that  government  workers  have  no  greater  claim 
(and perhaps a lesser one) than private individuals to enter private property 
against the will of the owner. The libertarian framework also assumes that 
existing property rights have a just origin so that the exclusionary claims of 
existing owners are legitimate. Or it assumes that any unjust origins are so far 
in the past as to be irrelevant from a moral point of view as applied to current 
ownership claims.
116 This set of assumptions is easily understood by members 
of our culture in the United States and they are associated with a particular 
conception of property that understands the “owner” as the sovereign of a 
castle with absolute power inside clear boundaries.
117 
Recognizing that the farmer's argument is based on a particular set of 
assumptions about social relationships, the meaning of property and liberty, 
and the proper relationship between sovereign powers and individual rights 
allows us to begin to question those assumptions and subject them to critical 
analysis. For example, while it is true that owners generally have the right to 
exclude non-owners from their land, this is only generally true. This, and all 
the  other  assumptions  captured  by  the  libertarian  framework  are  either 
overstated or wrong. Owners do not have absolute rights; rather, property 
                                                 
116 See Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession, and Sacred Obligations, 
38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006). 
117 Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society: Regulatory Takings and Just Obligations, 30 
HARV. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2006). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  58 
rights are limited to protect the personal and property rights of others. Nor 
are property owners perfectly free to place any conditions they like on those 
who enter their land. Neither are business owners subject to the same rules as 
are the owners of other kinds of property, such as homes. The farmer could 
not, for example, refuse to hire a worker because of his race even though you 
can choose your friends based on their race if you wish and deny entry to 
your home on a racial basis.  
In addition, the farmer is too quick to assume that the ownership rights 
are all on his side here. Tenants have the right to receive visitors in their 
homes; landlords are not entitled to prevent their tenants from having friends 
over for dinner. This right is so well accepted that few precedents establish it. 
It is assumed that the transfer of possessory rights gives the tenant the ability 
to create a home and that it is a necessary part of that right to form human 
relationships  with  family,  friends,  and  neighbors  and  to  receive  them  as 
guests  in  your  home.  It  is  a  contested  question  whether  farmworkers  in 
barracks have the status of tenants. If they do, then by inviting the workers to 
live on his land, the farmer has waived the right to exclude the defendants if 
the workers want to receive them in the barracks. In other words, it is the 
farmworkers – not the farmer – who own the right to determine whether 
these visitors are allowed in the barracks or not; by  interfering with their 
right to receive visitors, it is the farmer who is interfering with the property 
rights  of  the  workers,  not  the  defendants  who  are  interfering  with  the 
property rights of the farmer. 
Even  if  the  workers  do  not  have  the  status  of  tenants,  the  libertarian 
conception wrongly assumes that property rights are never limited to protect 
the  legitimate  interests  of  non-owners.  The  doctrine  of  necessity  allows 
individuals to enter the property of another to save a human life; thus, no 
trespasses  occurred  when  New  Orleans  residents  took  refuge  in  their 
neighbors' homes during Hurricane Katrina to escape from the flood waters. 
Federal  and  state  legislation  provides  assistance  to  migrant  farmworkers 
because  of  their  vulnerable  status  and  their  isolation  from  the  broader 
community. The owner has rights but so do the farmworkers; by claiming a 
right to exclude here, the farmer seeks to exercise his property entitlements 
so as to deprive his workers of the ability to get benefits to which they are 
legally entitled. Rather than exercising his own property rights, the farmer is 
arguably abusing his rights to prevent others from taking advantage of what 
they are entitled to claim – in other words, of what they own. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that migrant farm workers housed in 
barracks have the same rights to receive visitors as do tenants in apartments – Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  59 
regardless of what the contract says.
118 The farmer may be the owner of the 
land but by entering a contract that allowed his workers to live on his land, he 
parted with some of his ownership rights, and, according to the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey, it is the workers, not the farmer, who have the right to 
receive or turn away guests in their living quarters. 
 
§ 4.1.2 Framing the question 
 
A  second  way  lawyers  orient  themselves  and  decision  makers  is  through 
framing the question presented.
119 The farmer asks: who owns the land? The 
doctor and the lawyer will want to frame the issue rather differently. They 
will reverse the valence and put the onus on the farm owner to justify his 
actions. Instead of asking who owns the land, the defendants might ask, for 
example, “don't people have the right to receive visitors in their homes?” Just 
as the farmer's question suggests its own answer, this question also suggests 
its own answer, but this time in favor of the defendants. Alternatively, the 
defendants might ask whether the farmer is entitled to stop the government 
from providing services to needy people. Imagine, for example, how a judge 
would react if the farmer prevented an ambulance from entering his property 
to reach an injured worker who needed to be taken to the hospital. Could his 
right to exclude prevent the entry of the ambulance? Of course not. 
Various methods can be used to reverse the burden of persuasion – to 
put the onus on the  other side to justify the  ways in which their  actions 
impinge  on  the  legitimate  interests  of  the  other  side.  The  libertarian 
framework assumes, for example, that oppression comes when government 
officials  restrict  liberty  or  interfere  with  property  rights.  Conversely,  if  a 
person  is  exercising  his  rights  (especially  property  rights),  he  cannot,  by 
definition,  be  oppressing  someone  else.  This  worldview  assumes  that  the 
ownership of property and the exercise of property rights (including the right 
to exclude) are self-regarding acts.
120 Others have no legitimate interest in 
telling you what to do on your own land. If this is true, exclusion of non-
owners  from  one's  own  land  does  not  harm  others  because  the  owner  is 
entitled to exclude non-owners; that is what it means to be an owner. The 
farmer is doing nothing more than exercising his rights. Since non-owners 
have no legitimate claim to trespass on land they do not own, trespassers are 
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engaged in harmful, other-regarding conduct. The farmer will suggest that he 
is causing no harm to anyone while the defendants are invading his castle. 
The  defendants  will  frame  the  question  differently.  They  will  take 
advantage  of  the  legal  realist  conception  that  rights  protect  legitimate 
interests. This means that the scope  of a  legal right  is determined  by the 
interests it is designed to protect, and those interests, in turn, are defined to 
exclude illegitimate interests in harming or controlling others or otherwise 
denying  equal  liberties  to  others.  The  case  therefore  presents  normative 
questions about the legitimacy and relative strength of the parties' interests in 
this particular context. This framework makes it obvious that the exercise of a 
property right is not necessarily a self-regarding act; rather, such an exercise 
may harm the legitimate interests of others. An owner who uses his property 
so as to create air pollution is exercising his property rights but doing so in a 
way that creates externalities on neighboring owners and the community as a 
whole. An exercise of a property right is not necessarily a self-regarding act. If 
this  is  true,  then  it  is  not  just  government  officials  who  can  act  in  an 
oppressive  manner  by  exercising  illegitimate  power  over  others;  private 
property owners may themselves engage in oppressive behavior. Reversing 
the polarity, the defendants might ask (in the words of the opinion written by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey):  does  an  employer  have  the  "right  to 
isolate" his workers and deprive them of "associations customary among our 
citizens?”
121 
This way of framing the question reminds us that a free society is not one 
devoid of the rule of law. We are not perfectly free to do whatever we want. 
In our political and legal system, some contractual demands are out of line 
because  they  fail  to  treat  others  with  equal  concern  and  respect.
122  By 
preventing his workers from receiving visitors, the farmer is not associating 
with  them  on  mutually  advantageous  terms;  rather  he  is  seeking  undue 
control over their lives.  He  is acting  like  a master and treating them like 
servants. Far from a Jeffersonian yeoman farmer, he seems more like a feudal 
lord  or  a  plantation  owner  who  is  treating  his  workers  like  indentured 
servants rather than equal citizens. Because we live in a free and democratic 
society, autonomy is protected by allowing actors to determine the terms of 
their  agreements  with  others  but  only  so  long  as  they  do  not  violate 
minimum  standards  regulations  which  define  what  Jedediah  Purdy  calls 
legitimate “terms of recruitment” for market relations.
123 
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§ 4.1.3 Narrative 
 
A third way lawyers engage in orientation is through narrative. Every case 
starts with the facts and the way in which we describe the narrative of what 
happened can be a powerful tool in helping us figure out the moral of the 
story. We often come to learn what we think by finding out what happened, 
by seeing the facts in a certain way.
124 Lawyers present alternative versions of 
the facts. We teach students to create a core theory of what is at stake in the 
dispute, and constructing a story about what happened is a crucial part of this 
task. Coming to see the case one way or the other is part of how lawyers, 
judges, and jurors come to decide what the case means. Narrative techniques 
are not merely matters of strategy; nor are they merely matters of rhetoric. 
Rather, they are part of the way we reason about moral questions. They help 
us  come  to  see  what  matters.  Construction  of  appropriate  narratives  is  a 
necessary supplement to the generally more abstract methods of moral and 
political philosophy. Indeed, some philosophers, especially Margaret Urban 
Walker, have argued that narrative analysis, combined with consideration of 
responsibilities implicit in particular social roles and relationships, is the best 
way to reach moral understanding of the situation.
125 
The farmer is likely to start the story by noting that he owns his farm and 
chose to start a business by recruiting employees to work for him. He was 
entitled to start a business and run it as he wished. The workers were not 
forced to work for him and they voluntarily agreed to his terms. Moreover, 
their freedom to refuse to work for him meant that he had to shape the terms 
of the contract in a manner that attended to their legitimate interests. The 
story is a freely negotiated contract between A and B. If the law comes in now 
with  its  heavy  hand  and  rewrites  the  contract,  it  is  only  acting 
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paternalistically  by  interfering  in  a  voluntary  and  mutually  beneficial 
arrangement.  
The doctor and lawyer (and the Supreme Court of New Jersey) told the 
story differently. Here is part of what the Court said:  
 
Here  we  are  concerned  with  a  highly  disadvantaged  segment  of  our 
society.  We  are  told  that  every  year  farmworkers  and  their  families 
numbering more than one million leave their home areas to fill the seasonal 
demand for farm labor in the United States.… The migrant farmworkers 
come to New Jersey in substantial numbers.… 
The migrant farmworkers are a community within but apart from the 
local  scene.  They  are  rootless  and  isolated.  Although  the  need  for  their 
labors is evident, they are unorganized and without economic or political 
power. It is their plight alone that summoned government to their aid.
126  
 
Rather  than  a  legitimate  agreement  among  equal  citizens  who  mutually 
benefit from their deal, the court describes a group that is disempowered and 
disadvantaged but which serves crucial social and economic functions in the 
market economy. Indeed, others are wholly dependent on the services that 
migrant farmworkers provide; we could not live without them. Yet it is not 
clear  that  we  recognize  our  dependence  on  them  or  what  we  owe  them. 
Barbara Ehrenreich argues that we should feel 
 
shame  at  our  own  dependency;  in  this  case,  on  the  underpaid  labor  of 
others. When someone works for less pay than she can live on – when, for 
example,  she  goes  hungry  so  that  you  can  eat  more  cheaply  and 
conveniently – then she has made a great sacrifice for you, she has made you 
a gift of some part of her abilities, her health, and her life. The "working 
poor," as they are approvingly termed, are in fact the major phlanthropists 
of our society. They neglect their own children so that the children of others 
will be cared for; they live in substandard housing so that other homes will 
be shiny and perfect; they endure privation so that inflation will below and 
stock  prices  high.  To  be  a  member  of  the  working  poor  is  to  be  an 
anonymous donor, a nameless benefactor, to everyone else.127 
 
Rather than asking to left alone on his land, the farmer is asking for the right 
to isolate the workers, to deprive them of government services intended for 
their benefit, and to deny their "opportunity to live with dignity."
128 Quoting 
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from a government report, the court notes that "'no trespass' signs represent 
the last dying remnants of paternalistic behavior."
129 By denying the workers 
access to government services, the court suggests that the farmer was acting 
like a feudal lord or plantation owner, treating the workers like servants when 
all they ask is to be treated with equal concern and respect. This is not a story 
of a property owner asking to be left alone on his own land or an individual 
seeking protection from invasion of his property by the government. Rather, 
it is a story of a heartless employer who denies his employees basic services 
that  he  himself  enjoys  and  takes  for  granted,  subjecting  them  to  harsh 
conditions and social isolation. 
 
§ 4.2 Evaluative assertion 
 
§ 4.2.1 The argument from humanity (dignity) 
 
Whether we are presented with alternative orientations or a question of what 
to do within an agreed orientation, we then face the task of justifying one 
orientation or outcome over another. Normative argument both within and 
between  orientations  depends  on  what  Mark  Timmons  calls  evaluative 
assertions  –  statements  about  the  right  way  to  act  which  contain  built-in 
moral judgments.
130 Timmons argues that moral claims are “assertions” in 
the sense that they can be right or wrong, true or false. Moral realists argue 
that such claims are based on “moral facts” that can be discovered by the use 
of  introspection or reason or observation.  Moral irrealists,  like  Timmons, 
argue that truth or falsity of moral claims does not rest on correspondence 
with moral facts out there in the world; rather than being descriptions of 
external  facts  in  their  world,  moral  assertions  are  evaluative  judgments 
designed to guide conduct. Value judgments are not descriptions of some 
ultimate reality. Rather, they are claims we make on each other. Our inability 
to rest those claims on incontrovertible foundations outside human will does 
not deprive them of their value for human life; if we accept them, they can be 
used  as  contextually  basic  foundations  for  normative  argument.
131  Thus 
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Timmons argues that “[t]he content of ‘Apartheid is wrong’ is apartheid is 
wrong.”
132 The assertion that conduct “is wrong” is based, not on divine will 
or natural law but on a human judgment about defensible human conduct 
and the appropriate contours of social relationships. 
How does normative argument begin? It arguably begins when we feel a 
need to justify ourselves to others; this usually occurs when we engage in 
action or make a claim that affects others. According to one legend, morality 
began when God asked Cain: “What have you done?” התשא המ (ma asitah) 
The call to justify yourself may come from outside or inside; the pull may be 
external  (a  literal  question  from  others)  or  internal  (a  felt  need  to  justify 
ourselves). The Cain story rested on the idea that one had an obligation to 
defend oneself to God – a pretty heavy duty. The secular version of the story 
is the idea that one must be attentive to other human beings, simply because 
they are human.
133  
This felt obligation comes from a fundamental premise or assumption: 
human  beings  are  entitled  to  be  treated  with  dignity  and  respect.  This 
normative  impulse  is  different  from  the  teleological  argument  offered  by 
Hobbes; he suggested that it is in our self-interest to create a government that 
limits our freedom of action, enabling us to obtain security and avoid the 
violent death that may come from anarchy.
134 The normative impulse I am 
describing is based, not on self-interest, but on the sense that human beings 
matter, that they are of enormous importance, that each person is unique and 
irreplaceable, that, as Kant put it, they are entitled to be treated as “ends in 
themselves”  and  not  “merely”  as  means  to  satisfaction  of  the  desires  of 
others.
135 The normative impulse comes from a felt obligation to treat others 
with equal concern and respect. 
The Kantian idea that people are ends-in-themselves entitled to dignity is 
a secular equivalent of the religious understanding that human beings are 
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created in the image of God and are therefore of enormous importance and 
deserve to be treated with dignity.
136 The liberal corollary to this view is that 
each person is of equal importance and entitled to equal concern and respect. 
This insight leads to some version of the Golden Rule, perhaps the central 
moral principle governing the acceptability of public reasons; the equal moral 
worth of persons means that one cannot claim something for oneself while 
denying it to others. It also means that one cannot demand something of 
others  unless  one  can  give  reasons  that  we  think  they  should  be  able  to 
accept.  This  in  turn  is  the  source  of  something  like  Kant’s  categorical 
imperative, that an action cannot be justified unless it can be described by a 
principle that could be accepted as a universal law.  
If  other  people  are  entitled  to  be  treated  as  human  beings  –  in  other 
words, humanely – we then should feel an obligation to explain ourselves to 
others when we make claims or demands on them. It is more controversial to 
claim that we must account to others when we fail to help them; one area of 
debate  between  feminist  theorists  and  others  is  the  extent  to  which 
obligations  of  care  are  as  fundamental  to  humanity  as  are  obligations  of 
respect (or autonomy).
137 For now, however, I want to focus on a central 
impulse, which is a felt obligation to give reasons to others who seek to hold 
you to account for your actions (or your inactions). Those reasons, in turn, 
express  values.  They  announce  what  is  important;  they  say  what  really 
matters in human relationships.  
But  what  is  the  foundation  of  those  values?  Philosophers  may  debate 
whether  these  core  values  have  a  foundation  –  in  God  (Saint  Augustine, 
Thomas Acquinas), in human rationality (Kant), in communicative action 
(Habermas),  in  nature  (Hobbes,  Locke)  –  or  not  (Protagoras,  Nietzsche, 
Sartre,  Dewey,  Wittgenstein  all  argue  in  various  ways  that  human  values 
originate in human assertion). Although these philosophical debates are of 
some use to lawyers, they also may be partially set aside. Whether or not we 
can say that human values have a firm foundation in something other than 
human  will,  we  can  start  with  a  premise  that  seems  fundamental  to  our 
current sense of ourselves: human beings matter. 
Certainly  lawyers  start  from  this  premise.  They  take  for  granted  that 
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human beings are important, that they are of intrinsic and  immeasurable 
value, that they are imbued with dignity and entitled to respect. As someone 
once said, we hold these truths to be self-evident. Moreover, our current and 
evolving  social  norms  view  every  person  as  entitled  to  equal  concern  and 
respect. This fundamental assumption seems  obvious today but it has not 
always been universally accepted or respected. One need only think about our 
history  of  conquest  of  Indian  nations,  the  slave  system,  and  the  historic 
oppression of women, to understand that it is not a small matter to contend, 
to believe, and to act on the premise that all human beings are created equal, 
and that they are entitled to be treated as if their worth had no price.  
We  can  call  this  the  argument  from  humanity.  It  both  rests  on  the 
fundamental worth and importance of each person and the idea that people 
are entitled to be treated with humanity. Whether it is a universal principle or 
simply a fundamental assumption of our society is less important than the 
fact that, at least for us, it is a fundamental assumption. As Charles Taylor 
explains, we tend to want to give "an account" to explain why we have the 
intuition that human beings are entitled to "life and integrity." 
 
The account seems to articulate the intuition. It tells us, for instance, that 
human beings are creatures of God and made in his image, or that they are 
immortal souls, or that they are all emanations of divine fire, or that they are 
all rational agents and thus have a dignity which transcends any other being, 
or  some  other  such  characterization;  and  that  therefore  we  owe  them 
respect.
138 
 
Whether or not we can agree on a reason for respecting the humanity of 
individuals, it is a fundamental assumption of our social and legal culture 
that individuals have an innate dignity that must be respected by others. This 
belief obviously does not solve normative questions or make them go away. 
But it does furnish a foundational orientation to thinking about normative 
questions. It also rules many things out; the argument from humanity works 
partly by excluding laws that fail to treat persons as human beings.
139 Indeed, 
it may well be that this argument excludes a great deal. As Alan Dershowitz 
and Barrington Moore, Jr. both have argued, there is more agreement about 
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what  wrongs  we  should  avoid  than  on  what  rights  we  should  protect.
140 
Wrongs can be identified partly by asking what we cannot do to others given 
their status as human beings. Reminding ourselves that people are entitled to 
be treated with equal concern and respect itself generates the impulse to give 
reasons they could be expected to accept. And this, in turn, has substantial 
constraining effects on what legal rules we can publicly defend. 
It does not, however, make the normative question go away. Rather, it 
may encapsulate the core issue raised by normative dilemmas. For example, 
in State v. Shack, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the entry of 
the doctor and lawyer onto the farm did not constitute a trespass. The court 
argued that the workers were entitled to “associations customary among our 
citizens” and that the farmer had no “right to isolate” the workers by refusing 
to allow them to receive visitors in their homes.
141 This argument is premised 
on the notion that the workers have a right to "live with dignity."
142 They do 
not and cannot be made to occupy a subordinate status; they are people, not 
work horses; they are free, not serfs or slaves. As human beings, they are 
entitled to certain fundamental rights which others have a duty to respect. 
"Indeed,"  the  court  explained,  "the  needs  of  the  occupants  may  be  so 
imperative and their strength so weak, that the law will deny the occupants 
the power to contract away what is deemed essential to their health, welfare, 
or dignity."
143 
The farmer could answer this normative claim by arguing that he did not 
force the workers to work for him. They chose to do so and it would deny the 
farmer dignity if the court tried to control the terms on which he chooses to 
employ  others  on  his  own  property.  It  would  also  treat  the  workers  as 
incompetent children to deny them the freedom to contract with the farmers 
on terms chosen by them. Protecting the owner’s free control of his own land 
and the freedom of all the parties to contract on mutually beneficial terms is 
the  way  to  treat  each  person  with  equal  concern  and  respect,  while 
governmental regulation of property and contract fails to treat individuals as 
self-governing persons in charge of their own fates.  
Both of these sets of arguments depend on the fundamental assumption 
                                                 
140 ALAN DERSHOWITZ, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORY OF THE ORIGINS OF RIGHTS 
(2004); BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY AND UPON 
CERTAIN PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE THEM (1970). 
141 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971). 
142 277 A.2d at 374. 
143 277 A.2d at 372. On the role of needs in moral theory, see Soran Reader & Gillian Brock, 
Needs, Moral Demands, and Moral Theory  16 UTILITAS 251 (2004) (explaining the concept of 
a "morally important need"). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  68 
that human beings have a special status. They are entitled to be treated with 
dignity; they are entitled to autonomy (control over their own lives and the 
freedom to shape their destinies in relations with others). The debate is over 
the meaning of dignity – not whether human beings should be entitled to be 
treated  with  dignity.  Human  dignity  is  a  foundational  assumption  upon 
which  all  normative  argument  rests.  And  reminding  ourselves  about  this 
fundamental premise may persuade us that one resolution of a case is more 
just than another. 
 
§ 4.2.2 Asserting values (ought statements) 
 
If  human  dignity  is  at  the  core  of  normative  argument,  how  do  lawyers 
operationalize  that  core  value  in  hard  cases?  They  do  so  by  asking  what 
respect for humanity requires of us. Respect for human beings entails making 
claims  on individuals about proper rules of conduct in their relationships 
with others. Derived from the fundamental assumption of humanity, these 
claims amount to moral demands. As Charles Taylor explains, “The whole 
way in which we think, reason, argue, and question ourselves about morality 
supposes that our moral reactions have these two sides: that they are not only 
‘gut’ feelings but also implicit acknowledgments of claims concerning their 
objects.”
144  Value  statements  begin  by  identifying  human  interests,  wants, 
needs, and preferences and then characterizing what is valuable about them. 
Not all preferences are qualitatively equal. Some are mere tastes while others 
rise  to  the  level  of  human  values.  Values  are  assertions  about  right  and 
wrong; they embody judgments about the legitimacy of human interests and 
they support or undermine claims that people make on each other.  
Particular evaluative assertions are specifications, in some sense, of the 
fundamental  argument  from  humanity.
145  Many  of  them  will  be 
uncontroversial, although their application in particular cases may well be 
contested and contentious. These assertions generally are claims at a lower 
level of specificity that either take the form of statements of “rights” – ways in 
which we are entitled to be treated by others or ways in which we are entitled 
to act – or statements of “obligations” – duties we have to others to respect 
them  as  human  beings.  Some  of  these  judgments  can  be  powerful  either 
because  reflection  on  our  deepest  values  generates  specific  inferences  or 
because those judgments rule certain things out.  
The farmer will argue first that he has a right to control access to his own 
land. As owner of the property, he has no duty to allow strangers onto his 
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land. Indeed, they have an obligation to respect his autonomy by keeping off 
the land rather than invading it against his will. In addition, he will argue that 
he should be free to enter into contracts with his workers on whatever terms 
he likes as long as he can get them to agree. Individual liberty entails the 
freedom  enter  cooperative  relationships  with  others  on  terms  that  are 
mutually beneficial to the parties. The employment contract does not give the 
workers the right to receive visitors in the barracks; if they wanted such a 
right  they  should  have  bargained  for  it.  As  Alan  Schwartz  has  argued, 
"Individuals have the right to “do the best they can for themselves, given their 
circumstances.”
146 It is a fundamental assault on human dignity to dictate the 
course of someone’s life or to impose the terms of one’s associations with 
others by regulating contracts, thereby depriving individuals of the power to 
make their own choices, suffer from their own mistakes, and chart the course 
of their own destiny. If the farmer has too much power in the bargaining 
process because of his relative wealth, this can be remedied by a “tax-and-
transfer” program that increases the workers’ bargaining power, leaving the 
parties' arrangement to a free contract system that best respects individual 
autonomy and enlarges individual choice. 
Ruling that the farmer could not exclude the defendants from his land, 
the  Supreme Court  of  New  Jersey rested its opinion on a different set  of 
evaluative assertions. Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub wrote in the Court’s 
opinion: 
 
[W]e find it unthinkable that the farmer-employer can assert a right to 
isolate the worker in any respect significant for the worker’s well-being. The 
farmer,  of  course,  is  entitled  to  pursue  his  farming  activities  without 
interference.…  So,  too,  the  migrant  worker  must  be  allowed  to  receive 
visitors there of his own choice,… and members of the press may not be 
denied reasonable access to workers who do not object to seeing them.… 
[T]he employer may not deny the worker his privacy or interfere with 
his opportunity to live with dignity and to  enjoy associations customary 
among our citizens. These rights are too fundamental to be denied on the 
basis of an interest in real property and too fragile to be left to the unequal 
bargaining strength of the parties.
147 
 
These paragraphs contain a remarkable set of evaluative assertions, including 
(a)  it  is  "unthinkable"  that  the  farmer  could  "assert  a  right  to  isolate  the 
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worker," although (b) he is "entitled to pursue his farming activities without 
interference."  (c)  Nor  may  the  employer  "deny  the  worker  his  privacy  or 
interfere  with  his  opportunity  to  live  with  dignity"  or  (d)  "to  enjoy 
associations  customary  among  our  citizens."  (e)  The  workers  "must  be 
allowed to receive visitors." These assertions both express and assert values; 
they describe the shape of a social world that is appropriate to human life; 
they make claims that can be defended because they describe interests that 
are  entitled  to  respect  by  all  persons  and  which  therefore  constitute 
appropriate demands on others. 
Evaluative assertions often contain words like “should” or “ought.” This 
is because moral claims are demands we feel entitled to make of others and 
those demands shape allowable conduct. Lawyers need not be ashamed to 
make arguments that include the word “ought” – as in, tenants ought to be 
able  to  receive  visitors  in  their  homes.  But  why?  we  might  ask.  Why  do 
tenants have the right to receive visitors? Why not leave this issue to free 
contract? Why should the law interfere with the marketplace? It is important 
to  remember  that  these  questions  frame  the  issue  from  a  libertarian 
orientation. We could as easily flip the orientation and frame the question 
very differently, in a manner that highlights the values that support a ruling 
for the defendants, i.e., what gives the farmer the right to isolate his workers 
and deprive them of needed services?  
The  skeptical  stance  toward  values  is  what  leads  law  and  economics 
theorists  to  the  idea  of  deferring  to  individual  preferences,  whatever  they 
happen  to  be,  and  then  using  economic  analysis  to  figure  out  the 
consequences of alternative rules of law in order to identify the rules that 
maximize satisfaction of individual preferences. As I explained earlier, the 
fundamental  problem  with  this  normative  framework  is  that  it  wrongly 
assumes that all preferences should be satisfied and that all preferences are of 
equal  status.  The  libertarian  assumes  that  preferences  have  a  prima  facie 
claim to be satisfied. But this is not true; reflection reveals that a free and 
democratic society is defined by minimum standards for market and social 
relationships.
148  Some  preferences  are  out  of  bounds;  some  contractual 
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arrangements are indefensible; some uses of property are incompatible with 
the legal framework of a democracy and a free people. The assertion of a 
preference is not a self-regarding act when it involves creating arrangements 
that  affect  the  legitimate  interests  of  others,  especially  when  those 
arrangements deny liberty and dignity to others. 
But how do we ground the values we identify and assert? One ground is 
golden rule: would you want to be in a position where you could not receive 
visitors?  The  argument  from  consistency  suggests  that  if  you  value  this, 
humanity  requires  you  to  respect  it  for  others  as  well.  The  pragmatic 
argument suggests that we take for granted the things that no one seriously 
questions. If we agree that unnecessary cruelty is a bad thing or that children 
should  not  be  punished  for  the  sins  of  their  parents,  or  that  people  are 
entitled to form attachments with others, we can begin to build moral and 
legal principles that can serve as the basis for helping us think through harder 
questions.  Evaluative  assertions  can  provide  an  answer  to  the  “because 
clause” (expressing and explaining why certain values should be protected) 
by appealing to the things we in fact already believe.
149  In Charles Taylor's 
words,  they  articulate  or  bring  to  consciousness  both  our  background 
understandings and our strong evaluations. They make us conscious of the 
underpinnings of our moral lives. 
Of course, evaluative assertions do not necessarily decide cases, especially 
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hard cases that involve legitimate interests on both sides. For example, in 
State v. Shack, it can be argued that we have plausible autonomy claims on 
both sides. At the same time, a decision maker may be able to choose the 
appropriate  characterization  of the interests asserted  by the parties. Is the 
farmer, for example, asking for the freedom to manage his own business and 
enter mutually advantageous contracts or, on the contrary, is he asking for a 
"right to isolate" his workers and deny them "associations customary among 
our citizens?" Is he being stalwart in defense of his rights or obtuse in his 
denial of theirs? The decision maker needs to come to a conclusion about the 
plausibility  of  alternative  characterizations  of  the  interests  asserted  in  the 
particular case and assess the legitimacy of the asserted interests as human 
values appropriate to the situation. 
 
§ 4.2.3 Responsibilities in human relationships 
 
While normative argument starts with the recognition or belief in human 
dignity and then moves to more specific evaluative assertions associated with 
that fundamental value, the elaboration of the meaning of these values for 
legal  relations  among  persons  generally  gets  its  normative  shape  from 
conceptualizing the responsibilties arising out of human relationships. Dignity 
and  value  claims  are  often  used  to  assert  “rights”  but  those  rights  only 
translate into legitimate claims against others if we can conclude not only 
that  the  right-holder  has  an  interest  that  is  prima  facie  worth  protecting 
through legal control of the behavior of others but that those others are under 
no  conflicting  obligations.  To  come  to  this  conclusion,  we  have  to 
understand and shape the relationship between the parties. The nature of the 
relationship  will  help  determine  whether  one  of  the  parties  has  a 
responsibility to act (or refrain from acting) in a certain manner in regard to 
the right-holder. In the case of Hohfeldian “rights,” the question is whether 
the  other  party  is  under  a  duty  to  act  or  not  to  act,  while  Hohfeldian 
“privileges” or liberties impose a vulnerability on the other party to suffer the 
effects of the exercise of those privileges.
150 In either case, the legitimacy of 
the  claimed  legal  entitlement  cannot  be  persuasively  asserted  unless  an 
argument can be made that the “victim” of the right has a responsibility to 
respect  the  claim  of  the  right-holder  to  freedom  of  action  (privilege  or 
liberty) or security (Hohfeldian “right“). This relational perspective is most 
prominently associated with feminist moral and legal theory and is usefully 
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elaborated by philosopher  Margaret Urban Walker and political and  legal 
theorist Jennifer Nedelsky.
151 
In State v. Shack, the farmer argued that the relationship between the 
parties involved a free contract containing mutually beneficial arrangements 
that  was  entered  into  under  circumstances  that  involved  no  coercion  or 
fraud. The workers are not tenants; they do not have leases or the exclusive 
control of particular parcels of land or individual apartments. They are living 
on the employer’s property and legitimately subject to his rules. This is what 
parents say to children: if you are living in my house, you must follow my 
rules. Nor do the defendants have legitimate claims to enter the employer’s 
property against his will. If I let someone sleep in the back bedroom in my 
house, I am entitled to determine whether they receive visitors or not and the 
relationship between the parties here is no different. Neither the workers nor 
the defendants have claims that override the employer/owner’s interest in 
controlling access to his land. The employer-employee relationship is a freely 
negotiated one and the employees have agreed to enter the employer’s land. 
The relationship thus has a dual character as a contractual relationship and a 
property relationship. The contractual relationship is the freely negotiated 
employment/housing  agreement  and  the  property  relationship  is  the 
legitimate  claim  of  the  owner  has  to  control  of  his  own  land.  The 
employer/owner relationship with the defendants is a relation of owner to 
non-owner  who  seeks  access  to  his  land  and  because  the  owner  has  not 
opened his property to the general public (as would be the case, for example, 
with  a  public  accommodation),  the  defendants  cannot  claim  a  legitimate 
entitlement to intrude on his privacy or his property. 
The defendants would argue that the relationship between the parties is 
of an entirely different character. The employer has created a relationship 
between  himself  and  his  employees  that  goes  beyond  an  employment 
contract;  it  also  involves  housing  arrangements,  and  whether  or  not  the 
employees have “leasehold” interests, they are living apart from the employer 
and  can  exercise  rights  to  receive  visitors  without  intruding  on  the 
employer’s  privacy  or  his  ability  to  run  his  business  profitably.  The 
defendants  also  have  claims  on  the  employer/owner  which  give  him  the 
responsibility to let them onto his land. As the court states, the employer has 
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no right to isolate the workers or deny them “associations customary among 
our citizens” when the property use in question is distinguishable from the 
guest  in  the  back  bedroom.  In  effect,  the  property  use  is  legitimately 
understood as more on the “public” than the “private” side of the ledger; this 
is not a case of an owner controlling who accesses his living quarters, but is 
similar to the landlord who refuses to let his tenants receive visitors. That is 
deemed an oppressive relationship because the landlord is acting like a feudal 
lord who claims the legitimate right to control the tenant’s personal life in a 
manner that deprives the tenant  of autonomy and companionship.
152 The 
owner has a responsibility in the relationship to act in a manner consistent 
with the dignity of the workers and this necessitates relinquishing the right to 
exclude individuals who are providing needed services to his employees in a 
manner that does not interfere with his legitimate business interests when the 
owner  has  opened  his  property  to  individuals  in  living  arrangements  like 
those in this case.
153 
 
§ 4.3 Contextualization 
 
When  values  conflict  in  a  particular  case,  we  try  to  avoid  (or  solve)  the 
conflict  by  reinterpreting  the  values  so  that  they  fit  with  each  other  in  a 
manner that does not result in outright contradiction. We do this by asking 
how values fit the circumstances, thereby seeking to determine whether one 
asserted value is appropriate to the situation while the seemingly conflicting 
value is not similarly appropriate. This may result in a reinterpretation of the 
interests asserted by the parties that may lead to the conclusion that one of 
the asserted values is not actually implicated in the situation; alternatively, it 
may result in the view the conflicting values are both operative but that one 
value should be subordinated to the other in the context of the case. Three 
contextualization  methods  used  by  lawyers  are  (a)  situation  sense;  (c) 
restrained  interpretation  of  values;  and  (c)  social  and  historical 
accommodation. 
 
§ 4.3.1 Situation sense (distinguishing cases and making analogies) 
 
The first way lawyers contextualize is by focusing on the social setting within 
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which the issue is being addressed. The social context in which the right is 
being asserted matters because we find claims legitimate in one area of social 
life to be illegitimate when made in a different context. For example, you are 
legally free to choose your friends on the basis of race if you wish (even if this 
may  be  morally  problematic)  but  you  are  not  legally  free  to  choose  your 
customers by race if you are operating a restaurant. Thus, the lawyer argues 
that we are not talking about freedom of contract generally, but a specific 
contract term in a specific social setting. We are not talking about property 
rights generally, but a specific property claim in a specific social relationship. 
Contextual  elaboration  of  the  normative  meaning  of  principles  is  closely 
associated with the lawyerly technique of distinguishing cases. It also involves 
what Karl Llewellyn called situation sense – a Gestalt judgment about how to 
understand the morally relevant features of a situation.
154 
State v. Shack posed a conflict between the right to control your own land 
and the right to receive visitors in your own home. Doctrinally, it required a 
judgment about whether this case  fit  within a legitimate  exception to the 
owner’s ordinary right to exclude non-owners from the property. Could the 
presumption in favor of the “owner” be overcome? Alternatively, it involved 
a conflict of property rights; if the farm workers were similarly situated to 
tenants,  then  they  are  imbued  with  the  power  to  receive  visitors  in  their 
homes  or  to  deny  access  to  others.  If  the  workers  own  something  like  a 
leasehold,  then  they  have  the  right  to  exclude  or  admit  and  it  is  the 
landlord/farmer who would have to overcome that presumption. 
To answer this value conflict, the Supreme Court of New Jersey started 
with  three  assumptions:  first,  that  owners  have  the  right  to  exclude  non-
owners but that there are exceptions to this principle; second, tenants have a 
right  to  receive  visitors  in  their  homes  (either  because  this  is  one  of  the 
exceptions  to  the  first  principle  or  because  tenants  are  themselves 
conceptualized as owners of the “leasehold” who have the power to exclude); 
and third, that visitors do not themselves have the power to enter property 
without the consent of the property owner and, once admitted, visitors do 
not themselves have the power to invite others inside. While tenants have the 
right to receive visitors, dinner guests do not have the right to bring others to 
the dinner table without consent. Nor do overnight guests in your home have 
the  right  to  invite  anyone  they  want  into  your  hourse;  in  that  case,  you 
legitimately have much greater control over what they do in your house than 
you would if they rented a separate apartment from you.  
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The migrant farmworkers were housed in barracks and one of the issues 
was whether this social context was closer to that of the overnight guest (with 
no right to receive visitors) or to the tenant living in an apartment (with a 
right to receive visitors). Answering this question requires a judgment about 
how to understand the situation. If it is true that a guest in one’s home does 
not have the right to invite in visitors while a tenant does have such a right, 
the question is whether this case is closer to the first situation or the second. 
Answering this question requires the use of analogy. This involves identifying 
factual similarities and differences and generating reasons to treat those facts 
as relevant from a moral and legal point  of view.
155 In turn, this requires 
consideration of whether the interests asserted by the parties are legitimate in 
this social context. The court found that the farmer had legitimate interests in 
managing his business and excluding meddlesome outsiders but that he did 
not  have  a  legitimate  interest  in  isolating  his  workers,  denying  them 
“associations  customary  among  our  citizens”  or  preventing  them  from 
receiving government-funded services in the privacy of their living quarters. 
If this is true, then in the context presented in this case, the workers had 
legitimate interests in receiving visitors and government benefits while the 
employer had no legitimate interest in excluding the doctor and lawyer from 
his land. What appeared to be a conflict of values was actually a false conflict. 
The farmer, of course, asserted that his interests were legitimate in this 
context. He had not forced the workers to work for him or accept his terms; if 
they did not like the arrangement, they could go elsewhere to live and work. 
According to the farmer the situation here is simply a part of the free market 
working its magic; there is no basis for the court to substitute its judgment 
for  that  of  the  parties  on  what  contractual  arrangements  are  mutually 
beneficial. Nor does this contravene the rule that allows tenants to receive 
visitors. Workers living at their workplace in barracks are differently situated 
than tenants and the farmer’s needs to control the operation of his business 
are stronger than those  of a residential  landlord; conversely, the workers‘ 
interests  are  correspondingly  weaker  when  they  have  not  been  granted 
exclusive control over a segment of the property as occurs in the case of a 
leasehold because giving them the power to invite others onto the property 
could disrupt the business in ways that would not occur in the case of tenants 
receiving visitors in their apartments. 
 
§ 4.3.2 Restrained interpretation of values 
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Situation  sense  is  explicitly  or  implicitly  tied  to  re-interpretation  of  the 
conflicting values at stake in the case. Lawyers reevaluate the legitimacy of the 
asserted interests or the cognizability of the claimed harms in the particular 
context at issue. This is an example of the more general method of restrained 
interpretation.156  When  each  party  asserts  the  right  to  have  or  exercise  a 
property right, each owner experiences the exercise of the rights of the other 
as  imposition  of  an  externality.  However,  if  we  engage  in  restrained 
interpretation of the rights associated with “ownership,” we may convince 
ourselves that the bundle of rights associated with ownership never included 
the particular entitlement in question. If one never owned the right to begin 
with – if it never was part of the package of property rights an owner could 
legitimately claim – then a rule limiting the right will not be experienced as 
the imposition of an externality. In that case, one person is exercising her 
property rights and the other (the victim of the externality) has no legitimate 
claim. If we see the case this way, we may convince ourselves that exercise of 
the entitlement can be legitimately viewed as self-regarding in nature.  
For  example,  the  farmer  may  concede  that  tenants  have  the  right  to 
receive visitors in their homes but argue that they also have the right to waive 
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that entitlement in exchange for compensation or employment or lower rent 
from  the  landlord/employer.  Alternatively,  the  farmer  may  argue  that  the 
value of free association is not appropriate for employees at work; business 
cannot  operate  if  employees  are  free  to  invite  others  onto  the  premises. 
Although the workers are housed in barracks, their work/home boundary is 
less  clear  than  in  the  usual  case  and  their  rights  of  free  association 
correspondingly legitimately limited in this context. More on point, however, 
the farmer would argue that the defendants have no right of access to private 
property against the will of the owner. In this case, the workers are relevantly 
distinguishable from tenants and the owner who has the right to exclude or 
admit is the farmer, not his employees. He therefore has legitimate interests 
in  controlling  access  to  his  land,  and  they  are  making  claims  that 
illegitimately interfere with his liberty and property rights. 
Conversely, the workers will argue that when they are not working, they 
are  similarly  situated  to  tenants  and  their  rights  of  free  association  are 
relevant  and  important.  Moreover,  while  the  farmer  has  an  acknowledge 
right to run his business, that right can be fully protected without denying the 
workers the right to receive visitors. As the Court explained, the owner has 
“no legitimate interest” in preventing his employees from receiving visitors in 
their living quarters or enjoying “associations customary among our citizens." 
Either way, the normative technique is to narrow the scope of application of 
the value in question so that it does not conflict with the legitimate interests 
asserted by the other side. 
 
§ 4.3.3 Social and historical accommodation 
 
A third form of contextualization is to fit the case into current social practice, 
historical tradition, and emerging values and principles. The development of 
the  common  law  represents  a  series  of  compromises  between  fit  and 
justice.157 The rules must be made to fit with each other in a coherent way if 
possible; they must also be made to fit both our considered judgments and 
our settled social values and current social conditions. At the same time, our 
normative  claims  may  give  us  reason  to  criticize  existing  practices  or 
conclude that certain rules of law are inconsistent with other rules of law, 
emerging  or  settled  notions  of  justice,  or  competing  values  that  are 
appropriately relevant in this context.  
The farmer may argue that we have  moved from a customary regime 
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based on status and tradition to a dynamic market economy that rests on free 
contract and individual autonomy.  Promoting the  “free market” will both 
promote social wealth and individual freedom while keeping the state away 
from  unjust  interferences  with  autonomy  and  self-government. 
Opportunities abound for individuals and the operation of the free market 
will discipline employers who are harsh in their treatment of their workers. 
The  doctor  and  lawyer  (and  the  court)  argued  instead  that  we  have 
moved from historical customs of feudalism and plantation slavery, as well as 
unequal status of persons, to a free and democratic society that treats each 
person with equal concern and respect. This means that there are  certain 
minimum  standards  for  market  relationships  which  must  be  respected  in 
order  to  comply  with  the  appropriate  legal  framework  for  a  free  and 
democratic society. Isolating workers from visitors, insisting that the farmer-
employer observe discussions between his workers and their lawyers and the 
medical care granted them, is inconsistent with the form of social life we have 
developed that is based on human dignity and equality. The farmer’s claimed 
interests are not legitimate, at least in the context of this case. 
 
§ 4.4 Prioritization 
 
If  we  cannot  reconcile  conflicting  values  in  a  particular  case  by  careful 
designation of the scope of the values through contextualizing techniques, we 
must then seek some kind of impartial procedure or standpoint from which 
we  can  evaluate  which  of  the  conflicting  normative  claims  should  be 
vindicated, given their relevance in the context of the case.  In a  free and 
democratic society, we begin with the assumption that individuals, in general, 
are entitled to choose their own path, their own sense of the good life, and 
their own values. But of course, individuals do not live alone; we are engaged 
in  normative  argument  because  of  conflicts  among  human  interests  and 
because  we  cannot  avoid  choosing  an  applicable  law  to  govern  the 
relationship  between  the  parties.  Autonomy  must  be  conceptualized  in  a 
manner that is consistent with coexistence with others; this means that limits 
on  freedom  of  action  are  essential  for  responsible  human  relationships. 
Further, because legitimate government is based on treating each person with 
dignity (equal concern and respect), and thus on the consent of the governed, 
we must justify public policy and  law by reasons that could or should be 
accepted by every person subject to those laws. The three most important 
normative  methods  used  by  lawyers  to  analyze  persistent  conflicting 
legitimate interests are balancing interests, contractualism (golden rule or role 
reversibility), and reflective equilibrium (coherence). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  80 
 
§ 4.4.1 Balancing interests 
 
One primary prioritization method is the legal realist technique of balancing 
interests. This method is as useful to discussions of fairness and justice as it is 
to economic analysis. But normative argument based on notions of justice 
and fairness starts from the assumption that not all preferences are entitled to 
respect by the legal system, that not all interests can be weighted equally or 
counted as relevant in determinations of what the law should be and that 
there are qualitative differences among interests that make it impossible to 
reduce  them  to  a  common  metric  without  distortion.
158  These  normative 
balancing  discussions  identify  human  interests,  determine  when  they  are 
legitimate,  and  then  seek  to  weigh  (or  assess)  their  relative  strength, 
importance, or relevance in particular social and legal contexts. Normative 
analysis that focuses on concerns of fairness, justice, and morality generally 
eschews converting interests to a common metric (like dollars); comparisons 
of  interests  can  be  made  even  if  the  values  on  both  sides  are 
incommensurable (not reducible to a “common currency“). When we do this, 
we may talk about the “strength” or “weight” of the interests in context; we 
may  also  talk  about  which  interest  should  “give  way”  or  which  party  is 
obligated to defer to the interests of the other given the interests and values 
we have identified. We may say that certain interests are not “appropriate” or 
“relevant”  in  a  particular  context  when  the  competing  interests  are  of  a 
certain  character  or  kind;  in  such  cases,  one  interest  may  “outweigh”  the 
other. We may talk in terms of the “needs” of the parties, or again consider 
whether  the  “needs”  are  “legitimate”  given  the  impact  their  assertion  will 
have on others with competing needs, interests, wants, or claims. 
For example, while the farm owner in State v. Shack may have privacy 
interests, it is not clear that those interests should be recognized as strong or 
even relevant when the question is whether he is entitled to deny those same 
interests to workers housed on his land. Similarly, the farmer-employer may 
have associational interests in choosing whom to allow onto his land but it is 
                                                 
158 See ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3 (describing the importance 
of  different  ways  of  valuing  different  human  interests);  KYMLICKA,  supra  note  19,  at  144 
(arguing that "when we think  about  the value of different liberties in relation to  peo0ple's 
interests, we see that some liberties are more important than others, and indeed some liberties 
are without value entirely…"); April Flakne, Through Thick and Thin: Validity and Reflective 
Judgment 20  HYPATIA 115, 115-116 (2005) ("any attempt  to apply an ethical term  with an 
intuitive context within an existing vocabulary to a new or different context itself involves an 
act of judgment"). Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  81 
not clear that those interests are relevant (whether he is entitled to assert 
those interests) when he has opened his property to others and their own 
associational interests are at stake. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court found it “unthinkable” that the farmer-
owner could “assert a right to isolate” the workers or “deny the worker his 
privacy or interfere with his opportunity to live with dignity and to enjoy 
associations  customary  among  our  citizens.”  This  language  assesses  the 
farmer’s  interests  and  characterizes  them  in  a  manner  that  denies  their 
relevance, legitimacy or strength in this social context. In a sense, this is an 
argument that the owner’s interests do not count at all in the balance. The 
workers have strong interests in receiving visitors and government services 
and living in dignity and the farmer-employer has “no legitimate need” to 
deny them these rights. This makes the “balance” one that is assessed, not by 
market  measures  or  strength  of  preference,  but  by  appropriateness  to  the 
situation. Alternatively, the court could have found the owner’s interests in 
freedom of contract, control of his business and property, to be legitimate 
ones but overridden by the interests of the workers.  
The farmer could counter these arguments by suggesting that alternative 
means exist to protect the workers’ legitimate interests and that the court was 
wrong to assume that his assertion of control over his own land in any way 
prevented the workers from obtaining legal and medical services. Or he could 
argue  that  the  workers  voluntarily  waived  these  rights  by  entering  their 
contract  with  him  and  that  the  right  to  earn  a  living  by  obtaining  a  job 
outweighs  any  interests  regulating  the  terms  of  the  employment  contract. 
Part of this kind of argument may also rely on consequentialist concerns of 
the sort that suggest that regulation of the agreement may wind up hurting 
the  very  people  it  was  intended  to  protect  by  decreasing  their  wages  or 
limiting job opportunities. These adverse consequences of regulation could 
overwhelm  any  benefits  sought  to  be  derived  by  imposing  minimum 
standards on the contractual relationship, thereby reversing the balance of 
interests. 
 
§ 4.4.2 Contractualism (golden rule or role reversibility) 
 
How do we choose between two competing accounts of how to balance the 
conflicting  interests  in  the  case?  If  both  seem  plausible  and  equally 
convincing, we may turn to another prioritization method which rests on the 
idea of the social contract which itself is a derivation of the Golden Rule. We 
begin with the observation that treating other people with dignity requires us 
to try to see the world from their point of view as well as our own; we should Singer  Normative Methods for Lawyers  82 
consider how we would want to be treated if we were in their shoes. Christine 
Korsgaard and Tim Scanlon have both argued that morality is based on the 
idea that we must justify our actions by reasons that others could accept (or 
that they could not reasonably reject).
159 Rawls extends this insight to liberal 
political theory by assuming that we live in a society with persistent diversity 
on the meaning of the good life. If we respect each person’s dignity, we must 
consider  what  choices  reasonable  persons  would  make  about  the  basic 
structure of society if they could not be sure that they would be the ones in 
charge of the government.
160 What rules of the game would we favor if we did 
not know in advance what role we would play in society? What things do we 
hope to take for granted? What moral norms governing social interaction 
could be accepted by others and defended by those of us who want to impose 
them on others?
161 The method of reversing roles, of defending an outcome 
to the losing side, of recognizing the costs as well as the benefits of any rule, is 
a staple of normative argument used by lawyers. 
The farmer may ask whether you would like it if the government told you 
that you must open your property to strangers or told you how to manage 
your own business. The opposing side asks what the contract would have said 
if the contracting parties did not know on which side of the bargaining table 
they  would  be  sitting.  This  Rawlsian  question  suggests  that  the  farmer 
himself would not want to be deprived of the right to receive visitors as well 
as needed legal services and medical care if he were in the position of his 
workers.  Different  interpretations  of  these  arguments  are  possible.  John 
Rawls suggested we consider what rules would be adopted by persons who 
did not know which social roles they would be occupying. These rules could 
be justified to anyone, including those who appear to be the losers in the 
situation. Robert Nozick and Charles Fried suggest maximizing the scope of 
individual freedom, interpreted in a libertarian manner; Jedediah Purdy (and 
my own work) suggest a very different conception of what freedom entails.
162 
Fundamentally, the object of a judicial opinion is to recite reasons for the 
result that could justify the result to the losing party. The idea is that anyone 
who  thought  about  the  matter  clearly,  with  appropriate  information  and 
motivation, could accept this outcome as the  most just way to resolve an 
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intractable conflict involving competing values. 
 
 § 4.4.3 Reflective equilibrium (coherence) 
 
The  most  quintessentially  lawyerly  prioritization  method  is  a  version  of 
Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium.
163 In some ways, this is the most 
prototypically “legal” way of analyzing normative questions. We reason from 
general  principles  down  to  specific  cases,  but  we  also  use  the  system  of 
precedent  to  establish  fixed  points  that  are  at  least  temporarily  if  not 
permanently closed to revision. In moral theory, we do the same thing by 
starting with strong intuitions about how certain moral quandaries should be 
resolved and we relate those fixed cases to our general principles. When we 
consider a hard case, we reason back and forth between the cases and the 
principles with the goal of developing a coherent story of how they all fit 
together.
164 This cannot be done by applying an algorithm or a disembodied 
decision  procedure.  Nor  does  it  result  in  anything  like  an  equilibrium. 
Indeed, we lawyers were experts at deconstruction before deconstruction was 
invented. We know how to challenge claims, to unsettle certainties, to find 
the  incoherencies  lurking  behind  coherent  stories.  Yet  at  some  point,  the 
judge writing the opinion or the lawyer writing the brief or making the oral 
argument is satisfied that she has created a story that fits available normative 
and legal resources together in a manner that does the best job possible, given 
the  context  in  which  we  are  acting.  The  lack  of  a  determinate, 
noncontroversial  decision  procedure  is  beside  the  point;  when  multiple 
normative  arguments  are  relevant,  competing  and  contested  institutional 
roles are present, and values are conflicting but powerful, we simply have to 
do the best we can.  
Reflective equilibrium does not operate wholly deductively or inductively 
and it does not follow a decision procedure.  Nor does it resolve all value 
conflicts  by  an  algorithmic  metatheory.  Analysis  can  begin  from  the  top 
down by applying principles to particular cases. Or it can begin from the 
bottom up by characterizing the legal rules as applied in the past. The system 
of  precedent  allows  lawyers  to  tentatively  identify  a  few  fixed  points.  We 
know in this situation, the plaintiff wins for these reasons and that in this 
different situation, the defendant wins for these other reasons. The case we 
are addressing is hard because it arguably fits within both categories. We use 
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a  combination  of  argument  from  analogy  and  policy  arguments  to  help 
divide up the cases that are appropriately governed by one rule or another. 
We may wind up overruling a case, or narrowing its scope of application; 
alternatively,  we  may  broaden  its  holding  to  this  new  situation.  We  use 
factual similarities among cases but combine those factual discussions with 
attention to principle and policy that can legitimately distinguish the cases 
where a rule applies and where it does not apply. The result may not be a set 
of  principles  that  can  be  applied  deductively;  this  is  because  attention  to 
social context, and historical settlement of issues, as well as considerations of 
judicial role, all matter enormously. 
This method of reflective equilibrium also illustrates all the elements of 
working  within  a  tradition  (as  Alasdair  MacIntyre  expresses  it)165  and 
undertaking a craft that involves expertise (as Karl Llewellyn expresses it).166 
It also is shaped by practical reason rather than deductive logic and requires 
the exercise of considered judgment.
167 
In  State  v.  Shack,  the  court  determined  that  it  was  not  important  to 
decide whether the migrant farm workers were or were not in the status of 
“tenants.”  Either  way,  their  situation  was  close  enough  to  that  of  tenants 
(living apart from the owner but on the owner’s land) that the same values 
which lead us to protect the right of tenants to receive visitors applied here to 
the farmworkers. This resolution protected the farmer’s legitimate interests 
while simultaneously protecting the workers‘ legitimate interests and fit the 
situation into established normative patterns and moral relationships. The 
farmer had argued in contrast that the workers were not similarly situated to 
tenants and that the owner had legitimate interests in controlling access to 
his land, which was used for business purposes and not merely housing, that 
did not exist in the situation of the ordinary residential tenant. He could have 
argued that tenants should be entitled to give up the right to receive visitors 
in return for lower rent or other favorable concessions by the landlord and 
that the same reasons for expanding the realm of free contract would apply in 
this case. He might have argued that the poorest persons are even more in 
need  of  free  contract  than  richer  persons  because  their  choices  are  more 
limited to begin with.168 These normative arguments could be tied to cases 
that preserve the employer’s power to manage his business by controlling the 
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conduct of his workers while analogizing the workers to live-in housekeepers 
who give up some of their freedom to live in the employer’s home. 
In the end, the case was decided in the favor of the workers because, all 
things considered, the court found the story presented by the defendants to 
be a more compelling story. It better matched the court’s judgment about the 
appropriate  balance  of  interests  by  identifying  the  employer’s  asserted 
interests as illegitimate in the situation at hand and the workers' interests as 
both legitimate and consistent with the contours of a private property regime 
in a free and democratic society. 
 
§ 5.0 RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN JUDGMENT 
 
[I]t seems clear to me that many of the systems of rules we follow are in 
fact  inconsistent, and beyond this, it seems  inevitable that, in some 
cases at least, we have no course other than to learn how to live with 
this inconsistency.169 
Robert Fogelin 
 
Some contradictions are manifestly better to live with than others…
170 
Elizabeth Anderson 
 
The  notion  of  responding  to  a  responsibility  confronts  us  with  a 
paradox.  It  clearly  involves  an  element  of  choice  and  a  complete 
absence of choice. Responding to a responsibility to which one is called 
upon to respond is not the act of a subject. But neither is it simply a 
matter  of  being  “subject  to”  a  responsibility.  To  be  responsible  is  a 
mode of existence that cannot be reduced to either the passive or the 
active voice.171  
Johan van der Walt 
 
At the end of the day, normative arguments come from us and we cannot 
expect a human invention to save us from ourselves. “Where could I go,” 
Saint Augustine lamented, “yet leave myself behind?”172 But it is also true that 
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if  anyone  is  going  to  save  us,  it  is  going  to  be  ourselves.  We  create  our 
normative world but we also live by it. We are free in one sense to live as we 
please, to create the kind of society we want to create; at the same time, our 
need  to  live  with  others  –  to  cooperate  with  them  –  requires  us  to  give 
reasons for the claims we make on others, to justify ourselves by defending 
the world we seek to create in ways that others could also find attractive. We 
seek to satisfy our desires but we also subject those desires to critical thought, 
both learning and teaching ourselves about the desires we should suppress or 
fail to satisfy in order to live with others in a free and democratic society. We 
distinguish between base and higher desires; we limit our initial instincts by 
creating a moral space, a normative world. We see the conflicts among our 
own  values  and  seek  to  articulate  them  in  the  context  of  creating  and 
imposing law. We also criticize our own normative constructions and listen 
to critiques posed by others that we had not thought of; this is not a process 
that can come to a definitive end. As Charles Taylor explains, "Because our 
language  gives  expression  to  qualitative  distinctions,  by  which  we  have  a 
sense of higher goals, and hence have an emotional experience with strong 
evaluation, we open an issue which can never be definitively closed."
173 At the 
same time, despite our disagreements with each other, our internal conflicts 
among competing values we cherish, and our lack of a definitive decision 
procedure, "there is a lot we can still say to each other."
174 
We are the creators of our world (and our legal system) but we are also 
eternally  in  the  position  of  Cain,  hearing  the  question,  “What  have  you 
done?” and feeling compelled to have an answer – an answer that would be 
acceptable to those to whom we are accountable. Some may believe this is 
God but in the political/legal realm our audience is other people, as well as 
ourselves. In the end, we are the ones to whom we must account; this means 
we must be true to ourselves (including the depth and complexity of our 
values) and we must be true to other people to whom we bear responsibility. 
We hope that our reasons we give for our moral and legal choices are good 
ones and that they promote justice. Yet we must always be on the lookout for 
the danger of legitimation; it is pathetically easy to act on the basis of self-
interest  and  exercise  illegitimate  power  over  others  while  justifying  it  to 
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ourselves  as  the  height  of  virtue.  Oppression  can  be  committed  with 
impunity when the perpetrators are convinced that justice is on their side. It 
is horribly tempting to dismiss a claim of injustice by calling an argument 
“unsound,” retreating to the idea that it is incompatible with other settled 
practices, and then refusing to answer the claim by reasons that speak to the 
claim being made, either explaining why those practices are justified or why 
this case is different from them. It is also pathetically easy to forget to see the 
case from someone else’s point of view; it is even easier to think one knows 
what  their  point  of  view  is,  even  if  they  are  not  available  (or  sufficiently 
empowered) to explain it to you. 
We must therefore develop justificatory strategies that keep competing 
claims in mind, that prompt us to investigate how people actually experience 
moral claims and human relationships, and remember to remain open to the 
possibility that we may find out that we were wrong. We must seek reasons 
that could be persuasive to people who have very different comprehensive 
conceptions  of  the  good;  yet  we  must  also  be  aware  that  this  sort  of 
impartiality does not and cannot be completely divorced from controversial 
judgments and that some forms of the good will be suppressed no matter 
how  neutral  we  try  to  be.
175  Indeed,  if  our  goal  is  to  create  a  free  and 
democratic  society,  we  must  acknowledge  that  we  begin  with  certain 
fundamental normative commitments – things we used to call “inalienable 
rights” or “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” 
We  are  inhabitants  of  some  form  of  what  has  been  called  the  “post-
modern  condition.”
176  But  this  experience  is  not  so  new  as  one  might 
suppose. One of the most famous Jewish jokes of all time (so well-known that 
it appears in an early scene in Fiddler on the Roof) involves two disputants 
who approach the rabbi to ask him to resolve their conflict. The first one 
speaks, gives his arguments, and the rabbi is convinced. “You’re right,” the 
rabbi says. Then the second man speaks, makes opposite arguments, and is 
equally  convincing.  “You’re  right,  too.”  the  rabbi  says.  The  rabbi’s  wife, 
having heard all this, says to the rabbi, “You said he was right and now you 
say this one is right. But they contradict each other; they can’t both be right.” 
The rabbi responds, “You know, “You’re right too!” 
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It always hurts to analyze a joke, but this one is too close to the argument 
I want to make to let it go. What is the moral of the joke? One reading is that 
it is typical self-deprecating Jewish humor that is making fun of the rabbi, 
who  is supposed to  be  learned and  know the answer to all questions but 
clearly has no clue how to solve a hard problem. Does the rabbi have the 
answer or not? We tend to assume the law gives an answer and the rabbi is 
the expert in the law and since the law comes from God, we should be able to 
find out an answer either from the Torah itself, or the commentary of the 
rabbis elaborating on the meaning of the given rules. But the rabbi seems 
stumped; he sees the arguments on both sides and  has no way to choose 
between them. There must be an answer; they can’t both be right, but the 
rabbi has no way to find this answer. This either means he’s not a very good 
rabbi (that’s the self-deprecatory message – that he is not learned enough to 
see who is right) or it means that we were wrong to expect the rabbi to know 
better than the rest of us how to come up with a just answer for a hard case. 
Maybe there are no experts better than ourselves, or no answers out there to 
help us in cases of genuine doubt. 
But  another,  more  provocative  reading  of  the  joke  is  that  the  wife  is 
wrong  when  she  says:  “they  can’t  both  be  right.”  Perhaps  the  human 
condition  requires  us  often  to  confront  the  simultaneous  truth  of  two 
seemingly contradictory insights.177 We are often faced with hard cases that 
have no easy resolution. When this happens, we often have well-developed, 
strongly supported  normative arguments  on both sides;  we may feel torn 
between  competing  goods or values or  unsure how  to balance competing 
legitimate  interests.  We  may  not  know  where  to  draw  the  line  between 
incommensurable goods or we may not know how to divide social life into 
appropriate  spheres  for  the  exercise  of  different,  competing  entitlements. 
There is no easy answer and we have no ready way to choose between them. 
That is why the rabbi tells both men that they are right. This is not a mistake; 
the rabbi is not a bad rabbi, but a learned one who recognizes that the truth 
of the matter – the truth of our normative world – is that both are right even 
though they contradict each other. We have competing values and we are 
unsure how to draw the line. 
But in one sense, the rabbi’s wife must be right: when the case calls for a 
resolution, we must act. The law is not a theoretical system but a practical 
enterprise,  requiring  an  answer.  It  is  not  a  debating  society  which  can 
continue talking forever. We have a case and one of the parties must win and 
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the other lose right now, or some compromise must be reached. A rabbi who 
says they are both right is not doing his (or her) job if he or she is sitting as a 
rabbinical court empowered to decide the case. A law review author can take 
this position and say "it's very hard," and refuse to give a clear answer. But a 
judge cannot do this. Moreover, the rabbi’s wife insists that the resolution 
must be “right”; it must be a just resolution and it must be accomplished even 
though both of the disputants are right and no voice from heaven will save 
the decision maker from the need to decide the case. A choice must be made 
and reasons must be given – even though we know and accept the reasons on 
the other side and even though those reasons are ones we cannot repudiate. 
The Talmud deals with this problem by religiously (pun intended) preserving 
minority  opinions  and  by  sometimes  not  even  stating  which  opinion 
prevailed in the rabbinic courts. 
“You’re right, too” means that we have a duty to do the right thing even 
when we have no simple answer as to what this means and even though there 
are arguments on both sides that we accept, care about, and believe. Decision 
makers  need  to  act  and  need  to  give  reasons,  but  they  need  also  to 
acknowledge  counter-arguments  and  competing  reasons.  They  need  to 
recognize  the  injustice  they  commit  as  they  go  about  the  job  of  doing 
justice.
178 The absence of a metatheory that generates a determinate decision 
procedure to solve such cases does not mean that there is nothing to think 
through and nothing to say. Indeed, it is precisely in such cases where speech 
matters  the  most.  The  rabbi’s  wife  insists  on  a  resolution,  not  an  endless 
debate, and she insists that morality is possible even in the face of strong, 
competing  moral  claims  which  are  not  easily  resolved.  She  insists  on  the 
persistence of justice in the absence of a noncontradictory metatheory that 
resolves  competing  arguments.  She  insists  on  creating  a  normative  world 
where  justifications  matter  even  if  they  are  not  decisive.  She  insists  that 
reasons must be given for the choices we make.
179 
Normative  methods  provide  a  foundation  for  law  not  because  they 
provide answers to hard cases but because they help structure appropriate 
conversation  by  law  makers  about  what  really  matters.  They  force  law-
makers to speak to law-takers. Charles Taylor explains: 
 
All structures need to be limited, if not suspended. Yet we can't do without 
structure altogether. We  need to tack back and forth between codes and 
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their  limitation,  seeking  the  better  society,  without  ever  falling  into  the 
illusion that we might leap out of this tension of opposites into pure anti-
structure, which could reign alone, a purified non-code, forever.
180 
 
Normative methods structure human judgment but they also are constructed 
by human beings, who are fallible, who have a partial perspective on the 
world, who easily misunderstand, but who (hopefully) are also eager to do 
the  right  thing.  Our  best  practices  combine  plural  considerations  and 
multiple  methods;  in  particular,  they  combine  impartial  procedures  with 
fundamental values, narrative elaboration, and situational contextualization. 
Our  best  practices  in  making  normative  arguments  to  resolve  hard  cases 
make assertions that express evaluative judgments about why certain values 
outweigh other values in particular contexts in light of the appropriate way to 
understand the  meaning of the situation, the  events  that led up to it, the 
relations among the parties, and the contours of our way of life. The goal is to 
show respect for all persons affected by the dispute. Although there may not 
be a unique, mechanically derivable "right answer," the decision maker is still 
obligated to come up with her best formulation of the right answer.
181 At 
some point, the decision maker actually has to decide, and then has to justify 
the decision by the best reasons the decision maker can offer which show 
respect to the loser and which affirm the attempt to treat the loser with equal 
concern and respect.
182 
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All this seems very humanistic rather than logical, artistic rather than 
deductive, pragmatic rather than systematic. But, we should not lament the 
absence of a mechanical decision procedure for justice; such a procedure was 
never available to us in the first place, and if it were, we would not be the 
human beings we are or seek to be. The construction of a just world is a 
human task.
183 It is a job for grown-ups, not computers. It is not a task that 
can be completed, but it is also a not a task we can avoid. And it helps to 
remind ourselves that we have some notion of how to do this. 
Normative  method  is  meaningless  without  some  substantive  vision  – 
both of human beings and the just society. At base, the fundamental premise 
of all normative method is humanity.184 Human dignity is where we start and 
defensible  human  relationships  are  our  goal.  What  kind  of  society  best 
embodies “our” most fundamental values – the ones we can defend to each 
other, despite our differences about the nature of both justice and the good? 
Although our goal can be phrased in different ways, a good candidate is the 
creation of a free and democratic society that treats each person with equal 
concern  and  respect.  At  least,  I  have  so  argued.185  Through  all  the 
negotiations, procedures, briefs, arguments, trials, rulings, decisions, appeals, 
                                                                                                                
acceptable upon reflection may always be viewed as rebuttable by further considerations."); 
TAYLOR,  HUMAN  AGENCY  AND  LANGUAGE,  supra  note 44, at  62 ("Now our direct, intuitive 
experience of import is through feeling. And thus feeling is our mode of access to this entire 
domain of subject-referring imports, of what matters to us qua subjects, or of what it is to be 
human. We may come to feel the force of some imports through having explained to us their 
relations  to  others,  but  these  we  must  experience  directly,  through  feeling.  The  chain  of 
explanations must be anchored somewhere in our intuitive grasp of what is at stake."). 
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and scholarship, it behooves us to keep this goal in mind. 